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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Civil Rights Act of 1871-
"Under Color of Law" Defined
Plaintiff brought a civil suit for damages in the United States district
court under section 19791 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, against thirteen
Chicago policemen. The complaint alleged that the defendants, while
acting "under color of" Illinois law, committed an unlawful search and
seizure in violation of the federal constitution. 2 The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint claiming that since their acts were in clear violation
of Illinois law, they could not have been committed "under color of law"
within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. This motion was granted and
affirmed. 3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held
reversed. An official acts "under color of law" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1979 when the power conferred on him by the state enables him to
commit a wrong, even though the state power is misused. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
The fourteenth amendment, whether invoked directly or as implemented
by Congress, is limited to protecting the individual against "state action."4
To be entitled to relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must also
show that he was deprived of a federal right by one who was acting
"under color of law." The same facts may be significant in determining
each of these separate elements. "Under color of law" appears in the
criminal, civil, and jurisdictional sections of the act,5 and has the same
meaning in all three.6 Although "under color of law" has been defined
1. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, or any State or Territory subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). Hereinafter referred
to as section 1979.
2. The complaint alleged that the defendants, without a warrant, broke into the
plaintiff's house in the early morning hours, aroused him from bed, and forced him
to stand naked in the living room of the apartment while the residence was ran-
sacked. Then plaintiff was taken to a police station and held for ten hours while
being questioned about a murder, but no charges were ever made against him. 365
U.S. at 169.
3. Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. The criminal provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 241-42 (1958). The civil section is
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). The jurisdictional section .is 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (1958).
6. Substantive Civil Rights Under Federal Legislation, 3 RAcE, REL. L. Rmp. 133,
154 (1958).
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to include under pretense of law, section 1979 does not protect one from
an invasion of rights by an individual acting as a private citizen.7 Owners
of a private amusement park who ejected Negroes were held not acting
"under color of law."8 However, Kansas City's park commissioners, acting
pursuant to local law, were held to be acting "under color of law" in
excluding Negroes from a city swimming pool.9 In applying section 1979,
one problem is determining whether the words "under color of law" in-
clude only those acts of state officials which are done in strict obedience
to state law, or whether these words reach the case where state, as well as
federal law, is violated. Prior to this decision the leading case on the mean-
ing of "under color of law" was United States v. Classic.'0 The defendants
in that case were state election officials who had deprived Louisiana citi-
zens of federally secured voting rights, and in so doing had violated both
state and federal law." In affirming their conviction the Supreme Court
stated: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."12 The Supreme Court has
applied this language in later cases, holding that local policemen who had
beaten prisoners in violation of state law were acting "under color of"
state law.13 The members of the Court, however, have not been in com-
plete agreement on the meaning of "under color of law."14 Justice Frank-
furter has expressed the opinion that he could not "grasp the principle on
which the State can ... be said to deny the plaintiff equal protection of
the laws when the foundation of his claim is that the Board had disobeyed
7. See Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
8. Valle v. Stengel, 75 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1948).
9. Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
10. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
11. Id. at 325.
12. Id. at 326. The Court in Classic supported its holding by reference to three
of its earlier decisions, one of which involved the Civil Rights Act. In Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939), the plaintiffs sued under section 1979, alleging numerous viola-
tions of New Jersey law. The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction, accepting the
district court's findings that many of the acts of "personal restraint and interference
by force and violence were accomplished without authority of law." In Home Tel. &
Tel. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), the defendants contended that the four-
teenth amendment "deals only with the acts of state officers done within the strict
scope of the public powers possessed by them and does not include an abuse of
power by an officer." The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument: "It pro-
vides, therefore, for a case where one who is in possession of state power uses that
power to the doing of the wrongs which the Amendment forbids even though the
consummation of the wrong may not be within the powers possessed if the commis-
sion of the wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aided by the state au-
thority lodged in the wrongdoer."
13. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 97 (1945).
14. Chaffee, Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of the States and
Nation, 27 CEO. WAsH. L. REv. 519 (1959).
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the authentic command of the state."15 Likewise, lower federal courts have
disagreed on the content of the phrase. It has been held that a sheriff, his
deputy, and a state's attorney were not acting "under color of law" when
they unlawfully arrested the plaintiff and charged his excessive bail in
violation of state law.16 However, a prison official has been held to be
acting "under color of law" in the unlawfully beating of a prisoner.
17
Apparently the definition of "under color of law" in the previous Supreme
Court cases had been announced without full discussion of the legislative
history. The Court decided to re-examine the scope of the term fully in
the principal case. From its history the majority found that one purpose of
the act was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
available in theory, was not adequate in practice.
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claim of citi-
zens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunity guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state agencies.
18
This construction of the act enabled the federal courts to reach the case
where the official had violated state, as well as federal, law. This conclu-
sion was supported by references to statements made in the debates by
both proponents and opponents of the bill.'9 Although the Court relied
principally on congressional intent, it also relied on the interpretation it
had given in prior cases. The Court said: "We conclude that the meaning
given 'under color of' law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Wil-
liams cases was the correct one; and we adhere to it."20 Justices Harlan
and Stuart, in a concurring opinion, regarded the question of congressional
intent as a difficult one, but felt that unless the definition given in the
Classic case were clearly wrong, it should be followed.21 Frankfurter
dissented on two grounds. First, heretofore "under color of law" had been
construed to mean "action taken either in strict pursuance of some specific
command of state law or within the scope of executive discretion."2 He
also held that "all the evidence converges to the conclusion that Congress
by § 1979 created a civil liability enforceable in the federal courts only in
instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts because
some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage' sanctioned the griev-
ance complained of."23 Thus, the entire Court agreed that Congress could
15. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1943).
16. Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
17. United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953).
18. 365 U.S. at 180.
19. See CONe. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871).
20. 365 U.S. at 187.
21. Id. at 193.
22. Id. at 213.
23. Id. at 237.
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provide a remedy for a situation such as the instant one, but it divided
three ways on whether Congress did intend to legislate for this situation.
Prior to this case, a leading legal scholar made the statement that if one
knows what "under color of law" means, he knows "more than justices of
the Supreme Court,"24 notwithstanding the clear definition in the Classic
case. If any confusion existed previously as to the meaning of "under color
of law," it should now be removed insofar as applied to violations of local
law. The decision in the instant case must be analyzed in terms of the
proper allocation of powers as between the federal and state governments.
Assuming that a wrong was done in this case, should a state or a federal
court supply the remedy? Some, viewing the states as the real protectors
of civil rights, contend that the states should redress such wrongs, while
others want the federal government to have a free hand in protecting
civil rights.25 Whichever is the better position this decision is consistent
with a trend toward greater federal protection of civil rights, which began
about 1937 according to one authority.26 Defining "under color of law"
as an act done under pretense of law or by the misuse of power conferred
by state law, rather than limiting these words to acts done in strict pur-
suance of state law, gives the federal government more power to protect
civil rights from invasion by local officials. Since the phrase has the
same meaning throughout the act, it is possible that the Justice Department
may rely on this case in enforcing the criminal sections of the act. The
effectiveness of greater protection of civil rights through a broad construc-
tion of "under color of law" has been a subject of disagreement among
legal scholars. One view is that a broad construction of these words is
an effective deterrent in the police brutality cases.27 Others think that
little can be done under existing law adequately to protect civil rights. It
is submitted that the passage of a new, comprehensive civil rights act
would do more to protect individual citizens in 1962 than the re-interpreta-
tion of a statute "left-over from the days of General Grant."28
24. Chaffee, supra note 14, at 524.
25. CAR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 106-15 (1947).
26. RPPELY, CIvIL RIrs m -mE UNIrrED STATES 125 (1951).
27. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Micn. L. Rv.
1323, 1357 (1951).
28. Chaffee, supra note 14, at 529.
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. Conflict of Laws-Characterization-Amount
of Damages in Wrongful Death Action Held
to be Procedural and thus Controlled by Law
of the Forum
Plaintiff's husband was killed in the crash of defendant's airliner in
Massachusetts. The deceased bought his ticket and departed from New
York where both he and plaintiff were domiciled. An action was brought
in New York under the wrongful death statute of Massachusetts which
provided that a common carrier could be liable in damages in the sum of
not less than $2,000 nor more than $15,000.1 New York, in its wrongful
death statute, followed a strongly worded provision of its constitution by
prohibiting any limitation on the amount of recovery 2 Plaintiff contended
that the court should only apply that portion of the foreign statute which
did not offend this "public policy." In the court of appeals, held,3 in a
wrongful death action the amount of damages is a matter of remedial or
procedural law to be governed by the law of the forum, and a foreign
limitation on recovery will not be applied. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
Generally, when there is a conflict of laws in tort, the law of the state
of injury applies to substantive matters while that of the forum governs the
procedure. 4 Whether a matter is characterized as substantive or procedural
is determined by the court of the forum by reference to its own conflict of
laws rules.5 With few exceptions, American courts have held that the
1. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 129, § 2 (1955).
2. "The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in
death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to
any statutory limitation." N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 16; N. Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 130.
3. The statements of the court on this point are clearly dicta since the appeal con-
cerned only the appellate court's dismissal of plaintiff's second cause of action which
sounded in contract. It should be noted that neither party actually sought a ruling
on the separate tort cause of action. On this point Justice Fuld said: "[W]hether the
monetary limitation specified in the Massachusetts wrongful death statute may be
disregarded . . . should await an appeal where the issue is presented and the parties
have had an opportunity of briefing and arguing it." Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1961) (Fuld,.J., concurring). In agreeing that this
was dictum Justice Frossel said: "Although the first cause of action is not before us,
and it has not been argued or passed upon by the courts below, the majority of this
court is now reaching out to consider that cause of action, without application of any
kind with respect thereto on the part of anyone. . . . This procedure is not only
unprecedented but extends beyond our province." Id. at 532 (concurring opinion).
4. GooraIcH, CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 80 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAF, CoNrFLIcT OF LAWs
§§ 60, 118 (1959); 11 Am. Jun. Conflict of Laws §§ 182, 186, 188 (1937); RE-
sTATEmENT, CoNTrcT oF LAws §§ 378-84, 585 (1934); Leflar, Choice of Laws
Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. Rnv. 447 (1953). For an article questioning this
view see Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Hnv. L. REv. 881 (1951).
5. "The court of the forum, subject to the limitations of the federal constitution,
determines in accordance with its own Conflict of Laws principles whether the question
1961 ]
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amount of damages in tort generally, and in wrongful death specifically, is
substantive.6 A minority,7 on the basis of public policy, have used local
law, characterized as remedial or procedural 8 to reduce the amount recover-
able under a foreign statute. Despite the use, in some cases, of all-inclusive
language, none of the minority courts have increased the liability of the
defendant so that it exceeded that created by the foreign soverign.0 New
York was of the majority view as evidenced by numerous lower state court
decisions.' 0 The minority view had some local support in the old case of
Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. Ry." to the extent that it characterized the
amount of damages as remedial matter. The status of that case on this
point is certainly questionable since Justice Cardozo's vigorous attack on it
involved is one of substance or procedure." GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81 (3d
ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 58, 59 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
or LAws § 584 (1934). For a discussion of the factors involved in the decision see
Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YAUI L.J. 333, 343 (1933).
See also Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Co-MaLL
L.Q. 570 (1936); McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in thc Conflict
of Laws, 78 U. PA. L. PEv. 933, 937 (1930). For constitutional limitations see John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930); GooDmcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81 (1949); LmrFA, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 59 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONFaCT OF LAWs, Introductory note c. 12
(1934).
6. Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 762, 65 (1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (3d ed.
1949); LEFLAE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS
§§ 391, 412, 417 (1934).
7. GOODrICH, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 91, at 259, 97, at 273 (3d ed. 1949); LEVLAR,
CONFLICT OF LAws § 65 (1959); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 417, 606 (1934).
See also Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 762, 767 (1951).
8. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 762, 767, 775-77 (1951).
9. Id., especially Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. Ry., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050
(1891), applying a $5,000 "procedural" limitation to a claim, under a Pennsylvania
wrongful death statute, which was brought in the New York forum. Pennsylvania had
no limitation at that time. This may be significant, with reference to due process
issues, where the state has no substantial connection with the matter to which it seeks
to apply its law. If the law of the forum allows the plaintiff less, rather than more,
than the foreign law as in Wooden, no clear question of due process arises since
plaintiff sues in New York out of choice and might sue elsewhere if he did not wish to
be subject to its limits. If, on the other hand, more is allowed than under the foreign
statute, a definite question arises as to denial of due process to defendant; he, unlike
the plaintiff, has no choice as to where he is sued. "Because a law of the forum is
applied to plaintiffs who voluntarily submit themselves to it is no argument for imposing
the law of the forum on those who do not." Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
591-92 (1953). The Supreme Court has implied that any question of due process
disappears if there are substantial connections between the forum state and the matters
in question so as to make the application of its law reasonable. "We have held it a
denial of due process of law when a state of the Union attempts to draw into control
of its law otherwise foreign controversies on slight connections, because it is a forum
state." Id. at 590-91 (refering to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra note 5, where the state
had used an exaggerated characterization in order to utilize the law of the forum). See
generally LEFL.an, CONFLICT OF LAws § 59 (1959).
10. Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 762, 765 (1951). Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
11. 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891).
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in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.12 In three federal court cases in which New
York law was applied, it was held that the limitation in the foreign wrong-
ful death statute would apply in New York.13
The majority in the instant case reasoned (1) that it was arbitrary to
allow limitation on the value of the life of one of its traveling citizens
merely because the airplane in which he was a passenger happened to
crash in a particular state;14 (2) that New York had a number of significant
contacts with the matter in dipsute;' 5 (3) that there was no contrasting
significant interest of Massachusetts as a basis for subjecting New York
domiciliaries to such "unfair and anachronistic treatment" when this could
be avoided "without doing violence to the accepted pattern of conflict of
law rules";16 (4) that it was open to New York, as the forum state, to
characterize the amount of damages recoverable as a matter of remedial or
procedural law, and then to invoke its public policy to prohibit any limita-
tion;1 7 and (5) that the facts called for such a ruling. Although these
statements were clearly dicta18 they indicate a reversal of the former
trend 9 in New York state courts and apparently call for a complete reversal
of the position taken by the federal courts applying New York law.20
The "center of gravity" of all "significant contacts" in the instant case
clearly fell in New York.21 Massachusetts had no "significant contacts" as
12. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). For a discussion of the effect of Loucks on
the Wooden opinion in the instant case, see 172 N.E.2d at 533 (Frossel, J., concurring).
13. Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949); Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Snow v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 385 (S,D.N.Y. 1959). It is interesting to note that both the Pearson
and Snow cases involved the same crash as in the instant case. They result in the
situation refered to by Justice Frankfurter in Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 413 (1952),
where the federal courts make a decision construing local law and are, in effect, later
overruled by the highest court of the state. All three relied on Faron v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1948). For a discussion of the
problem see Carnahan, What Is Happening in the Conflict of Laws: Three Supreme
Court Cases, 6 VAiu. L. REv. 607, 628-37 (1953).
14. 172 N.E.2d at 527.
15. Id. at 527-28. Cf. concurring opinion of Justice Fuld: "If this were a matter of
first impression, it might be effectively argued that, where 'two or more communities
are touched or affected by a factual sequence', the 'guide to the governing law'
should be the jurisdiction having 'the most significant contact or contacts' . . . and,
since the contract of safe carriage was undertaken in New York . . . this State's
wrongful death statute and not that of Massachusetts should apply." Id. at 531.
16. Id. at 527-28.
17. Id. at 529.
18. See note 3 supra.
19. See note 10 supra.
20. See note 13 supra.
21. Deceased was a New York domiciliary; the contract for safe carriage was made
in New York, where he purchased his ticket; the airplane took off in New York; the
defendant was doing business in New York; the plaintiff and other survivors of the
deceased were domiciliaries of New York and might become dependents of the state
under an adverse ruling; and the action was brought in the New York forum.
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a basis for the arbitrary limitation in this case.22 In view of these facts, it
was very reasonable for the court to apply the substantive law of New
York as to the amount of damages,23 but this did not justify their characteri-
zation of the matter as procedural. If New York applied the same charac-
terization when all significant contacts were in Massachusetts it would be
so unreasonable as to be violative of the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion.24 It is unfortunate that the court chose this course rather than to
provide the same flexibility in the choice of tort law that it had already
provided for contracts in Auten v. Auten,2 5 or that which the Supreme
Court had provided for admiralty torts in Lauritzen v. Larsen.26
Criminal Law-Insanity-Third Circuit Adopts
A New Test for Criminal Responsibility
The defendant was tried and convicted of violation of the Dyer Act.'
His defense was insanity, predicated on medical reports indicating the
defendant had a basic sociopathic personality with emotional instability,
and certain schizophrenic reactions. The district court's charge to the jury
on this issue was in terms of the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse"
tests of insanity. On appeal, held, reversed. A charge based on the
M'Naghten test was prejudicial error, and a new test of criminal responsi-
22. In the instant case the only Massachusetts contact was that by fortuity the plane
crashed on her soil.
23. See notes 9 and 21 supra.
24. See note 9 supra.
25. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). Here the court of appeals adopted "the
center of gravity' or 'grouping of contacts' theory of the conflict of laws. Under this
theory, the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place
of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place 'which has
the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute' . . . thus allowing the forum
to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of
[the] particular litigation'." Id. at 101-02.
26. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). "Maritime law, like our municipal law, has attempted to
avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points
of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose competing
laws are involved. The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing of
the significance of one or more connecting factors between the shipping transaction
regulated and the national interest served by the assertion of authority." Id. at 582.
For a good article on this problem, see Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 TExAs L. REv. 657 (1959).
1. "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or air-
craft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958). After the
defendant had agreed to buy a car, the salesman permitted him to drive it for a
brief period. The defendant drove the car from Ohio to West Virginia, and then to
Pittsburgh where he abandoned it.
[ VOL. 15
RECENT CASES
bility is to be used. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
Today, insanity tests for judging criminal responsibility provoke as much
controversy as any other problem in criminal law.2 The first formulation
of such an insanity test was the "right-wrong" criterion promulgated in
M'Naghten's Case.3 The federal courts4 first adopted the M'Naghten rule,5
and then supplemented it with the "irresistible impulse" test6 after this
modification had been approved by the Supreme Court.7 An amalgamation
of these two tests remained the basis for judging criminal responsibility
in all of the federal courts until 1954, when the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, drawing on an old New Hampshire decision,8 put forth a new
test for insanity in Durham v. United States.9 This decision evoked much
praise,'0 and criticism," from writers in both the legal and medical pro-
fessions, but, when put in issue, was expressly repudiated by three federal
2. "Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that this subject is receiving more
attention today than any other subject in the criminal law." Commonwealth v.
Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E.2d 914, 919 (1958).
3. "[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722
(H.L. 1843). In the instant case, Judge Biggs offers evidence that this test can be
traced to the sixteenth century. 290 F.2d at 764.
4. Brevity precludes any discussion of the insanity tests employed by the states.
As of 1955, thirty-one states adhered only to the M'Naghten test; fourteen states had
supplemented M'Naghten with the "irresistible impulse" test; and one state (New
Hampshire) had a test similar to the Durham rule. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app.
A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
5. United States v. Young, 25 Fed. 710 (E.D.N.C. 1885).
6. "The mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is no longer the correct test
• . . where the defense of insanity is interposed. The accepted rule . . . is that the
accused must be capable, not only of distinguishing between right and wrong, but
that he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible impulse, which means before
it will justify a verdict of acquittal that his reasoning powers were so far dethroned
by his diseased mental condition as to deprive him of the will power to resist the
insane impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong." Smith v.
United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
7. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
8. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
9. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "The rule . . . . is simply that an accused is
not criminally responsible if the unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect." Id. at 874-75.
10. Biacs, THE GumI-- MnxD (1955); RocHE, THE CMIINAL MIND (1958); Doug-
las, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L.
REv. 485 (1956); Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From M'Naghten to Dur-
ham, and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened
Justice, 22 U. Cm. L. luv. 331 (1955).
11. Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REv.
25 (1955); Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the M'Naghten Rules, 42
A.B.A.J. 917 (1956); Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 367 (1955).
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circuits.12 Though rejected by the courts, the Durham decision was not
the only expression of dissatisfaction with the prevailing insanity tests.
Even before Durham, writers bad stressed the need to overcome the appar-
ent fetish for M'Naghten, and develop a more comprehensive test which
would incorporate the advances in psychological knowledge and methods.13
In the Third Circuit, Judge Biggs, who wrote the opinion in the instant
case, had, in a vigorous dissent, questioned the adequacy of the M'Naghten
and "irresistible impulse" tests.14 The English Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment was critical of M'Naghten, and advocated a new test.15 Quite
naturally, after the Durham decision there was a renewed interest and
investigation into the area of criminal responsibility.16 Attempts were
made to devise new tests, rejecting that which was defective, vague, and
ambiguous in the M'Naghten, "irresistible impulse," and Durham tests.17
These new proposals met with some approval,18 but were not adopted in
a judicial decision until the instant case.
As indicated above, Judge Biggs, of the Third Circuit, has long been
critical of the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests,19 but in judicially
supplanting them there were certain obstacles to overcome. One extremely
difficult point was the failure of the Supreme Court ever to have approved
any but the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests for the federal
courts.20 To circumvent this problem, the court assumed that the Supreme
Court, in the earlier cases, only approved the M'Naghten and "irresistible
12. Voss v. United States, 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958); Sauer v. United States,
241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.
1956).
13. E.g., WEHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRMNuNAL LAW (1933); Zmuoono,
TaE PSYcHoLOGY OF E CmunNAL AcT AND PUNtusxM&rr (1954).
14. United States ex rel. Smith v. Bald!, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951). For a fur-
ther discussion of this case and the dissenting opinion, see BIGGs, op. cit. supra note
10, at 127-35.
15. ROYAL COMUrSSION ON CAPITAL PumIsmENT (1953).
16. See, e.g., Symposium, Insanity and the Criminal Law-A Critique of Durham v.
United States, 22 U. Cii. L. REv. 317 (1955).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE: § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This test is set forth at
note 27 infra. A committee appointed by the Maryland legislature, and headed by
Dr. Guttmacher, also proposed a new test. See United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp.
187, 190 (D. Md. 1958).
18. Illinois has recently adopted by statute the American Law Institute test. ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd Crim. Code 1961). "The tests proposed by
the American Law Institute and the Maryland committee have much to recommend
them." United States v. Hopkins, supra note 17, at 190.
19. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion); BiraGs, op. cit. supra note 10.
20. In the Davis case, supra note 7, the Supreme Court had approved a charge
based on M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse." This decision was reaffirmed in
Matheson v. United States, 227 U.S. 540 (1913). It should be reiterated that this
discussion is limited to the federal court system. The Supreme Court has, more
xecently, not disturbed a state's application of only the M'Naghten test. Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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impulse" tests, without making them "paramount and exclusive."21 The
strongest basis, however, upon which the court supported its deviation
from the earlier cases was the lapse of time since the last Supreme Court
decision manifesting such approval 22 During this forty-eight year period,
psychology has made great strides forward, and its new concepts present
the phenomenon of insanity in a completely different perspective and afford
new sources of knowledge for judging criminal responsibility. In light of
this progress in medical science, it seemed reasonable to conclude that the
Supreme Court would not today impose M'Naghten as the rule for the
federal courts.2 3 Having decided that it was necessary and permissible to
formulate a test more closely alligned with present psychological tech-
niques, there remained the larger obstacle of verbalizing a test which would
utilize these techniques and still be meaningful to a jury of laymen. Be-
cause it limits itself to only the cognitive capacity, the M'Naghten test was
not comprehensive enough to meet the court's requirements.24 But the
court impliedly accepted M'Naghten's basic assumption of responsibility
and moral agency, and for this reason, rejected the Durham rule. In
addition, the Durham test seemed weakened by an inherent vagueness in
its terms and by an overemphasis on the causal relationship between
"disease" and "product" which to some extent precluded a consideration
of the ordinary requirements of mens rea.25 The concept of responsibility
had to be retained because the jury must, in effect, make a social judgment,
not a medical analysis. With these requirements and objectives before it,
the court formulated this test for judging criminal responsibility: "The
jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he
is alleged to have violated."2 6 In a footnote, the court acknowledged the
insanity tests proposed by the American Law Institute and the Royal
21. 290 F.2d at 769. But in Leland v. Oregon, supra note 20, the Supreme Court
said the Davis decision, approving M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse," "establishes
no constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal courts." 343 U.S.
at 797.
22. The last time the Supreme Court approved M'Naghten and "irresistible im-
pulse" for the federal courts was in 1913 in Matheson v. United States, supra note 20.
23. "[T]he Supreme Court in view of the present state of medical knowledge,
would not approve the M'Naghten Rules and would not impose them as the test to
be applied today by a jury to determine the criminal responsibility of a 'Mentally ill
defendant in a trial in a federal court." 290 F.2d at 770. Parenthetically, among
the present members of the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, supra note 10, Justice
Frankfurter, 290 F.2d at 765-66, and apparently Justice Black, United States ex rel.
Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (dissenting opinion), have objected to the
M'Naghten test as being inadequate.
24. 290 F.2d at 765-67.
25. Id. at 773. For further discussion of why the Durham rule fails in this regard,
see Judge Burger's concurring opinion in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Wechsler, supra note 11.
26. 290 F.2d at 774.
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Commission on Capital Punishment, upon which it had drawn.27 The
principal objective of the court was to have a test which will put before
the jury the total personality of the accused, and, at the same time, mold
the test in such a way that it will be consistent with the purposes of the
criminal law in its capacity as a social agency.
There is, in the test promulgated by this court, a realization and accept-
ance of the fact that insanity is a relative state, projecting itself in varied
forms in different situations. This view of insanity comes from a recogni-
tion of the advances made in psychology, and a desire that the criminal
law make full use of medical science, an idea advocated long ago by
Justice Holmesm Here the court has succeeded in putting forth a test
which, on the technical level, avoids M'Naghten's categorical rejection of
all but the cognitive capacity, and simultaneously avoids the vagueness of
Durham. The test succeeds, where Durham fails, in giving the jury a
standard by which it can properly determine whether the defendant was
capable of possessing the necessary mens rea. Thus this test does not
ignore its social responsibility. In essence, the court's formula is much
closer to the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests, devoid of their
absolutism,2 9 than it is to the Durham rule. But, regardless of its merit, a
new ruling like this poses certain questions. For example, can a circuit
27. Id. at 774 n.32. The American Law Institute test is: "A person is not respon-
sible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The test proposed by the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment is as follows: "The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of
committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know
that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it."
RoYAL CoUmnssION ON CArrrAL PuNIsmANT (1953). As can be seen, the court's
test is identical to the ALI test with the exception that the court has eliminated the
phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct." This phrase, the court feels,
is somewhat superfluous, and overemphasizes, especially to the mind of the jury,
the cognitive element, which is the very weakness of M'Naghten that the court is
trying to avoid. Removing parts (a) and (b) of the Royal Commission proposal
makes that test similar to the one in the instant case.
28. "An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its legislative justifica-
tion from science. As it is now, we rely upon tradition, or vague sentiment, or the
fact that we never thought of any other way of doing things, as our only warrant
for rules which we enforce with as much confidence as if they embodied revealed
wisdom." HoLlwms, Learning and Science, in COLL_ TED LEGAL PAPERs 139 (1920).
29. "In addressing itself to impairment of the cognitive capacity, M'Naghten de-
mands that impairment be complete: the actor must not know. So, too, the irresisti-
ble impulse criterion pre-supposes a complete impairment of capacity for self-control.
The extremity of these conceptions is, we think, the point that poses largest diffi-
culty to psychiatrists when called upon to aid in their administration. . . Nothing
makes the inquiry into responsibility more unreal for the psychiatrist than limitation
of the issue to some ultimate extreme of total incapacity, when clinical experience
reveals only a graded scale with marks along the way." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01,
comment at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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court properly lay down a different ruling without prior action by the
Supreme Court?30 Will the administration of this new test impose some
of the problems incurred in the application of the Durham rule?31 Does it
not make for a difficult situation when one test is used in the District of
Columbia, another in the Third Circuit, and still another in the remaining
federal courts? Finally, since the Currens decision is not expressly a pros-
pective ruling, will there be difficulties with appeals of past verdicts ren-
dered under the old test? In time, of course, all of these questions must,
and will, be answered. For the present, the Currens case is another breach
of the tradition-clothed M'Naghten rule; it is a step forward in the effort to
judge the defense of insanity in relation to all the new and tenable discov-
eries of medical science. And it might be suggested, with some degree of
confidepce, that if the Currens case reaches the Supreme Court, this new
test for criminal responsibility would be affirmed.32
Criminal Law-Smith Act-Membership Clause
Requiring Active Membership in Communist
Party and Specific Intent To Use Violence Held
Not To Violate the First or Fifth Amendments
The defendant, an active member of the Communist Party, was convicted
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina in 19581 for having violated the membership clause of the Smith
30. In the majority opinion of the case, Judge Biggs says the Supreme Court "de-
sires to treat the circuits as it does the states, as laboratories for the development of
substantive law." 290 F.2d at 769. But see Howard v. United States, supra note 12:
"In the face of such recognition by the Supreme Court of a test [M'Naghten and
"irresistible impulse"] of criminal responsibility, we do not feel at liberty to con-
sider and decide whether . . . some other test should be adopted. This Circuit follows
the law as stated by the Supreme Court and leaves any need for modification thereof
to that Court .... " 232 F.2d at 275.
31. See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity De-
fense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905 (1961).
32. See note 23 supra.
1. The defendant was first tried and convicted in 1955, and the judgment affirmed
in Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955). After certiorari had been
granted and argument presented the United States confessed error because of the
Court's intervening decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The
judgment was reversed, 355 U.S. 1 (1957) (per curiam), and a new trial took place
in 1958. Remarking as to the length of time which this case had been in the courts,
Mr. Justice Clark once said, "It looks as if Scales' case, like Jarndyce v. Jarndyce
[DIcKENs, BLEAK HoUSE (1853)], will go on forever, only for the petitioner to reach
his remedy, as did Richard Carstone there, through disposition by the Lord." Scales
v. United States, 360 U.S. 924, 926 (1959) (order for reargument). Scales, however,
was not subjected to such a fate.
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Act,2 which makes membership in any organization advocating the violent
overthrow of the Government while knowing of the organization's purposes
a crime. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
the conviction.3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The
membership clause of the Smith Act, interpreted as requiring "active"
membership and specific intent to accomplish the aims of the organization
by violence, does not abridge the freedom of speech and association
guaranteed by the first amendment, nor does it impute guilt by association
so as to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, petition for rehearing denied, 366 U.S. 978
(1961).
The Smith Act was held to be constitutional as early as 1943 when it was
considered by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.4 In referring to
the membership clause of the act, the court rejected the argument that the
clause imposed guilt by association, finding, instead, that the guilt thus
imposed was "entirely individual and personal."5 The Supreme Court first
construed the Smith Act in the controversial case of Dennis v. United
States.6 Although the Court did not specifically pass on the membership
clause,7 it decided that the structure and purpose of the act required proof
of the defendant's intent to overthrow the Government by force and
violence as an essential element of the crime of advocating violent over-
throw. The Court in the Dennis case also held that the "clear and present
danger" test is satisfied when the gravity of the evil, discounted by the
improbability of the evil occurring, justifies the particular invasion of free
speech-assuming that the invasion is necessary to avoid the danger. 8 It is
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958). The so-called "membership clause" reads as follows:
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
government [i.e., the Government of the United States or the government of any state,
territory, district or possession thereof, or any political subdivision therein] by force or
violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or
assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof-Shall be fined not more than $20,000
or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both ....... The other clauses of the
act punish those who advocate, abet, advise or teach violent overthrow and those who
publish or distribute such printed matter.
3. Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1958).
4. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790
(1943).
5. Id. at 143. The court also held the "clear and present danger" doctrine inappli-
cable in a situation where the legislative body has determined by statute that these
utterances involve sufficient danger of substafitive evil that they may be punished.
Id. at 145. Accord, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Contra, Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
6. Note 5 supra.
7. The defendants in the Dennis case were charged with conspiring to violate those
clauses of the Smith Act making criminal the advocation of violent overthrow and the
organization of any group which advocates such overthrow.
8. Id. at 510. The Court found that the defendants' intentions to overthrow the
Government "as speedily as circumstances would permit" afforded the requisite danger.
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on this aspect of the case that the critical eye of a number of legal writers
have looked with disfavor.9 During the interim between the Dennis and
Scales cases, the Supreme Court was not called upon to rule on the mem-
bership clause of the act.10 There were, however, rulings in the lower
federal courts on the membership clause. In Frankfeld .v. United States,"
which involved a conspiracy to violate several clauses of the Smith Act, one
being the membership clause, the court of appeals upheld the conviction.
It found the clause to be valid in that the element of guilty knowledge
made the defendant a party to the criminal actions of the group.'2 The
membership clause likewise survived a district court's scrutiny on a motion
to dismiss the indictment, the court noting that the statutes "careful
language precludes the possibility that the innocent may be ensnared." 3 A
number of state statutes either similar to or mirroring the Smith Act also
were upheld 14 prior to the Court's ruling that Congress had "occupied the
field" when it passed the Smith Act.'5
Before arriving at the constitutional issues, the Court in the Scales case
first construed the membership clause to have two implied requirements
other than the express requirement of knowledge of the organization's
purposes: (1) active, as opposed to nominal, membership and (2) specific
For a careful analysis of the history of the "clear and present danger" test from the
time of its origin in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) see id. at 503-11.
The Court in the Scales case, however, did not consider the application of the "clear
and pre~ent danger" doctrine since the petition for certiorari did not raise this issue.
367 U.S. at 230 n.21. For a discussion of the relationship between the membership
clause and that doctrine as it was interpreted in the Dennis case see Scales v. United
States, 260 F.2d 21, 25-26 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); United States
v. Blumberg, 136 F. Supp. 269, 270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
9. E.g., Antieau, Dennis 1. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5
VAND. L. REv. 141 (1952). The author of this article rejects the Court's interpretation
of the clear and present danger criterion: "However, the heart, the core, the particular
contribution of the criterion lies in its rightful insistence that the danger be both clear
and present, not doubtful, not remote nor possible nor probable .... Surely today, and
tomorrow too, the ideas cherished in our American heritage will survive attack from
the nonsense uttered by these poor peddlers of pap and promise. . . . The test of
constitutional freedoms can not be the hollow fears of seared, suspicious men without
faith in democratic processes." Id. at 144-45.
10. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), involving the same offenses as the
Dennis case, was reversed by the Supreme Court for improper instructions to the
jury and insufficient evidence.
11. 198 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
12. The circuit courts in the Scales case and its companion case also found the
statute valid. Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 2 (1957); Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 1 (1957).
13. United States v. Blumberg, 136 F. Supp. 269, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
14. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23,
136 N.E. 505 (1922); Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 145 Ad. 295 (1929). See generally Annots., 1
A.L.R. 336 (1919), 20 A.L.R. 1535, 1543 (1922), 73 A.L.R. 1494, 1498 (1931).
15. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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intent to accomplish the aims of the organization by violence. As to specific
intent, the Court based its conclusion on the theory that the reasoning of
the Dennis case, which implied specific intent into the "advocacy" and
"organizing" clauses, would likewise apply to the membership clause. 16 The
element of active membership was arrived at on the basis that (1) the
penalty imposed by the statute was too heavy for Congress to have intended
to punish mere passive members and (2) Congress would impose an
objective standard of membership as fixed by the law itself, rather than
allow it to vary with the standards of membership as subjectively viewed
by the organization. 17 This would assure an even-handed application of
the statute. Having so construed the clause, the Court then turned to the
defendant's argument that the membership clause did not satisfy the
concept of personal guilt required by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, but instead, imposed guilt by association. However, the
Court rejected this contention, reasoning that the quantum of guilt
inherent in membership in an organization doing illegal acts, when
accompanied by guilty knowledge, was no smaller than the amount of guilt
required in the familiar concepts of conspiracy and complicity.18 The Court
found a sufficient and significant form of aid and encouragement to the
illegal acts in the required elements of active membership, guilty knowl-
edge, and specific intent so as to permit the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions.19 In rejecting the defendant's contention that the membership clause
infringes upon free political expression and association as protected by the
first amendment, the Court again relied on its construction of the statute.
16. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1951).
17. Cf. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954) (deportation cases requiring active membership). It was also helpful to find
the requirement of active membership in order to avoid conflict with the Internal
Security Act of 1950 § 4(f), 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1958) which states:
"Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any
person shall constitute per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this
section or of any other criminal statute." (Emphasis added.) See 367 U.S. at 207-08.
18. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) includes in the
crime of complicity the following:
"(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offence
if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offence,
he
(i) commanded, requested, encouraged, or provoked such other person to
commit it; or
(ii) aided, agreed to aid or attempted to aid such other person in planning or
committing it; or
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offence, failed
to make proper effort so to do....'
19. "[W e can perceive no reason why one who actively and knowingly works in
the ranks of that organization, intending to contribute to the success of those specifically
illegal activities, should be any more immune from prosecution than he to whom the




The Dennis case held that advocacy of violent overthrow of government, as
punished in the Smith Act, is not constitutionally protected speech; nor is
a combination to promote such advocacy a protected association. There-
fore, the Court could see no reason why "membership when it constitutes a
purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guaran-
tees of that Amendment."2 0
It is apparent that what the Court has done is to define the statute in
such a way as to avoid more difficult problems of constitutionality.2' It
would seem that conviction for the mere act of becoming a member in
such an organization might not satisfy the due process standards of
criminal imputability.2 2 Also, without the requirement of specific intent to
accomplish the organization's illegal aims by force, association with a group
having both legal and illegal aims would be made criminal even though
the member adhered only to the legal aims. This might be so substantial
an abridgement of freedom of association as to be unconstitutional.23 The
main problem presented by the case seems to be whether the Scales case
has further expanded those limitations placed on free speech and associa-
tion by the Dennis case, or has merely applied the Dennis doctrine to a
situation which comes within the limitations that case has already imposed.
The Dennis case held that there is no constitutional right to conspire to
organize an association whose purpose is to advocate this violent overthrow
of the Government, nor is there a right to conspire to advocate violent
overthrow. It seems also that the Dennis case has been interpreted as
requiring an overt act to constitute the conspiracy-for example, conspiracy
presently to advocate violent overthrow, as opposed to conspiracy to
advocate in the future.24 Even if that be so, active, knowing, and intentional
20. Id. at 229.
21. Cf. 360 U.S. 924 (1959) (order for reargument), where the Court requested
arguments in this case on the constitutionality of the statute both with and without
each of the elements of active membership and specific intent.
22. "It may indeed be argued that such assent [to the organization's purposes and
activities by merely joining it] and [moral] encouragement do fall short of the
concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by
a commitment on the part of a conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise."
367 U.S. at 227-28. For arguments as to the unconstitutionality of the clause if inter-
preted not to require active membership see Comment, Communism and the First
Amendment: The Membership Clause of the Smith Act, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 527 (1957).
23. "If there were a . . . blanket prohibition of association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real danger that legitimate
political expression or association would be impaired ....... 367 U.S. at 229. But
thanks to the requirement of specific intent, "the member for whom the organization
is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within
the ban of the statute .... such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely
optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a criminal." Id. at 229-30.
24. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324 (1957), Developments in the
Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. Rrv. 920, 948 & n.187 (1959). Contra,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 561 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 579 (Black,
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membership in the illegal organization is no more remote, or perhaps even
less remote, from the undesirable result of attempted revolution than is
such a conspiracy;25 for the defendant, in becoming a member of the
group, has become what is in effect a party to a conspiracy,2 6 not just to
advocate, but actually to overthrow the Government.27 As a practical
matter, it appears that the Court has construed the membership clause so
that it adds little to the remainder of the Smith Act. In most instances,
in order to establish that a defendant had been an active member,
had knowledge of the guilty purposes, and had intended to accomplish the
organization's aims by force, the proof would necessarily include showing
the defendant advocated, abetted, advised, or taught violent overthrow;
thus he could be punished under that clause of the act. Finally, if one
accepts the holding of the Dennis case and its application of the clear and
present danger test, there can be but little question as to the constitution-
ality of the membership clause as it was interpreted.m
J., dissenting); cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961). In a case
decided at the same time as the Scales case, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
on the membership clause stating, "[I)t is present advocacy, and not an intent to
advocate in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the future once a groundwork
has been laid, which is an element of the crime under the membership clause. To
permit an inference of present advocacy from evidence showing at best only a purpose
or conspiracy to advocate in the future would be to allow the jury to blur the lines of
distinction between the various offences punishable under the Smith Act." Ibid. At
best, this statement would seem to leave the problem somewhat muddled.
25. "The law [the Smith Act] denounces a conspiracy to form, or affiliate with, an
organization whose purpose it is to advocate the overthrow of government by force
or violence. This conspiracy is one step ahead of the actual formation of or affilia-
tion with the organization, two steps ahead of actual advocacy, and three steps ahead
of attempted revolt." Reference-Freedom of Association, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 207,
214 (1959).
26. "Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organiza-
tion; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge that the organiza-
tion is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membership
with such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawful enterprise in which it is
engaged." Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 684 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 922 (1953). The Scales case states that "there is no great difference between
a charge of being a member in a group which engages in criminal conduct and being
a member of a large conspiracy .. " 367 U.S. at 226 n.18.
27. "The membership clause of the statute is, of course, nothing more nor less
than a statute denouncing and making criminal a conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment by force and violence." Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581, 587 (4th Cir.
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 1 (1957).
28. The dissents of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, however, are primarily




Criminal Procedure-Evidence-States May Not
Constitutionally Use Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure in Criminal Cases
Defendant, indicted for knowingl3i possessing obscene matter in violation
of Ohio law,1 objected to the introduction into evidence of certain lewd
books and pictures unlawfully seized by Cleveland police officers who,
without a search warrant, broke into defendant's home. The trial court
overruled the objection and rendered judgment against the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this ruling and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Ohio statute2 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. The fourth amendments embodiment of the right of
privacy is enforceable against the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, evidence obtained as a result
of the violation of that constitutional right is inadmissible in a state court.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Since the decision in Weeks v. United States,3 federal courts have con-
sistently deni6d the admission of evidence procured by federal officers in
violation of the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from illegal
search and seizure.4 The adoption of this exclusionary rule represented a
departure from traditional common law5 by the .process of "judicial impli-
cation"6 rather than by an explicit mandate of the fourth amendment.Y
State courts, faced with the dilemma of admitting or excluding illegally
obtained evidence, seem to be in irreconcilable conflict,8 having advanced
a "contrariety of views"9 in justification of their positions. 10 The Supreme
1. Omo REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Baldwin 1960), which provides in part that "no
person shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control an obscene,
lewd, or lascivious book [or] ... picture .... "
2. 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920), in'each of which the Weeks case was cited and its rule applied.
5. At common law the established rule was that "the admissibility of evidence is
not affected by the illegality of the method through which it is obtained." 8 WxclsfolE,
EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940). Similar statements are made in McCoRmicK,
EVIDENCE § 137 (1954) and 20 Am. Jun. Evidence § 393 (1939).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
7. Ibid.
8. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 225 (1960). The Supreme Court, in an
appendix to its opinion, lists twenty-six states as allowing the admission of evidence
illegally seized by state officers and twenty-four holding such evidence to be excludable.
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1939).
10. Compare Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 88 (1894) where, under the
assumption that no compulsion to incriminate was involved, it was held that "how-
ever unfair or illegal may be the methods by which evidence may be obtained . . .
if relevant, it is admissible .... ." with State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d
810 (1956), where the court viewed such admission of evidence as a violation of
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Court, in Wolf v. Colorado," rejected the contention that the due process
clause required state adherence to the Weeks rule, relying to a great extent
upon the availability of other means 12 by which to prevent illegal police
action. An intermediate step from the Wolf holding to an exclusionary
rule applicable to state courts was taken in Elkins v. United States,13 where
it was held that evidence illegally seized during a search by state
officers was inadmissible in a federal court. The Mapp decision's resolution
of the issue-how to protect citizens effectively from illegal police action-
was not then unanticipated.
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant case that the exclusionary
rule is an essential part of both the fourth and the fourteenth amendments
seems to be the culmination of what was termed in Elkins a "halting but
seemingly inexorable"14 movement. The Wolf decision, while demanding
that the states apply the substance of the fourth amendment, refused to
require as a constitutional matter that they use the procedural means of
excluding illegally obtained evidence. The majority opinion overrules
Wolf,' 5 reasoning that a denial of the procedural correlative-exclusion of
evidence so procured-vitiates any intent to effectuate the Wolf sanction.16
However, the Court's primary and most persuasive basis for decision, be-
yond any mere logical extension of Wolf, is that by no other means than an
exclusionary rule can state and local law enforcement officers be prevented
from acting illegally.17 Mr. Justice Black grounded his concurring opinion
on the conclusion that the admission of evidence unlawfully obtained is
violative of the fourth and fifth amendments considered jointly.18 Three
defendant's rights under the state constitution, thereby violating the fourteenth
amendment.
11. Note 9 supra.
12. The Court said, referring to the rejection of the Veeks rule, that it cannot be
regarded "as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons . . . to the
remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police,
under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford." 338 U.S. at 31.
13. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court relied heavily in Elkins on the practical
necessity of a non-ambivalent approach aimed at preventing violations of the fourth
amendment by police officers. This aspect of the problem was discussed by the
majority in the instant case, but not to such a degree. Another consideration in Elkins
was "the imperative of judicial integrity," 364 U.S. at 222, advancing the idea that
admitting illegally procured evidence depicted the federal government as a violator of
its own laws.
14. 364 U.S. at 219.
15. 367 U.S. at 654-55.
16. Id. at 656. In the language of the Court, "To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."
17. Id. at 657-60. Contra, Wolf v. United States, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949), where
the Court enumerated such means. The achievement of this end was felt by the Court
in Mapp to outweigh any other, including possible lost convictions, and led it to deny
the validity of the famous statement of Cardozo: "The criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(1926).
18. 367 U.S. at 661-62. The dissent criticizes Mr. Justice Black's position by citing
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), where the Supreme Court held that the fifth
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members of the Court dissented, in part on the ground that the majority
could have avoided the precise issue decided by a determination of the
less far-reaching question of the constitutionality of the Ohio statute,19
and in part from a conviction that such a procedural rule can not be
imposed upon the sovereign judicial systems of the states.20
In excluding illegally obtained evidence from both state and federal
courts, the Mapp decision has settled a problem particularly troublesome,
collectively speaking, to the states.21 In so resolving this issue, however,
the case may have engendered new questions equally burdensome. The
law enforcement problems of state and local agencies differ substantially
from those of their federal counterparts. Many crimes are discovered by
state and local officers as a result of chance encounters or pleas for emer-
gency assistance, and the opportunities and temptations to seize upon evi-
dence without observing normal procedures are correspondingly frequent.P
In contrast, the detection of crime by federal officers generally results
from deliberate investigations which allow time for proper forms to be
followed, The experience of California's law enforcement officers with
an exclusionary rule2 4 illustrates that, contrary to the result in federal
prosecutions, 25 the ability of state and local police to obtain convictions
may be markedly circumscribed. Indeed, a study of the record of one
municipal court26 seems to indicate that, the exclusionary rule is more
likely to preclude the admission of evidence in cases involving serious
offenses2 7 where conviction is more important to the public safety than in
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not applicable to the states.
19. 367 U.S. at 672-76.
20. Id. at 680. -
21. See note 8 supra.
22. AnLow, POLIcEMEN AND PEOPLE 2 (1947).
23. MILLSPAuGH, CRIME CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 25 (1937);
Comment, 50 J. Cair L., C. & P.S. 144,, 158 (1959), where it is stated that "One
must remember, however, that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between an
investigative Iagency such as the FBI which can appropriate long hours and great
man power to the preparation of an action, and a local police force which cannot."
24. "The chief of the State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement reported .. . that
the decision [People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), in which the
California Supreme Court held that unlawfully obtained evidence was inadmissible in
California courts] had cut arrests of dope addicts and peddlers by state agents by
nearly two-thirds." Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALw. L. RIv. 565, 589-90 (1955), -
25. The federal courts have operated under the Weeks rule for almost fifty years
and "it has not -been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of -Investigation has
thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts has thereby been disrupted." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
218 (1960).
26. Branch 27 of the Chicago Municipal Court. This study is shown in tabular
form in Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493, 498 (1952).
27. Ibid'. .The study indicates that motions to suppress evidence have been granted
in a greater: percentage of the -cases involving narcotics violations and carrying con-
cealed weapons than in cases involving lesser crimes.
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cases involving lesser crimes. It is here, at the trial level, where the true
impact of the rule upon law enforcement is felt;- but the decision is not
without effect upon police departments. Even the federal courts, bound
by the Weeks rule for over forty years, have been unable to establish rea-
sonably clear definitions of the rules of search and seizure by which to
guide federal police agencies and have been compelled to resolve search
and seizure issues on an ad hoc basis.29 The addition of uncertainty con-
cerning the law in this field to the requirement that state and local police
make rapid decisions in emergency situations may handicap state and
local authorities in the fulfillment of their law enforcement function, par-
ticularly in view of the increased incidence 30 of crime.
Evidence-Hearsay-Old Newspaper Article
Admitted as Evidence of Facts Contained
on Grounds of Necessity and Trustworthiness
In an action against its fire and lightning insurers for damages resulting
from the collapse of a courthouse tower,' the plaintiff, Dallas County,
asserted that the collapse was caused by lightning. The defendants, how-
ever, claimed that the tower was structurally defective and introduced a
contemporary account in a 58-year-old newspaper article2 in support of
their argument that charred timbers found in the debris were not due to
lightning, but to a fire which occurred in 1901. The trial court, over' a
hearsay objection,3 admitted the newspaper in evidence, and the jury
returned a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
28. Comment, 50 J. Cnir. L., C. & P.S. 144, 159 (1960); DocumrNTs ON FUNDA-
mENrAL HuMA1N RIHTS 534-35 (Chafee ed. 1951). In 24 GA. B.J. 129, 131 (1961) is
presented a corollary to the difficulties ahead for trial courts-in states admitting
illegally obtained evidence prior to the Mapp decision there is generally no procedural
device similar to FED. R. Cmm. P. 41(3), which allows a motion for the suppression of
evidence, and consequently, until the legislatures of these states act on the problem,
criminal trials will necessarily be interrupted to prove the legality of evidence. "This
leads to confusion for the jury and to criminal trials burdensome in length."
29. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
30. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1961, at 140 (82d ed. 1961).
1. The action was originally brought in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama,
but was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama on diversity of citizenship. , 1
2. The article was an unsigned description of a fire which destroyed the then
unfinished tower of the courthouse.
3. Dallas County also contended that Alabama law was controlling in this matter un-
der the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). A study of this facet of the
case is beyond the scope of this report, but see 14 VmAND. L. RBv. 1017 (1961) fora
discussion of the application of the Erie doctrine to rules of evidence.
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newspaper was admissible because of its necessity as a source of informa-
tion and because of its trustworthiness. .Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
The rule excluding hearsay evidence is a distinctive anomaly of the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,4 but one should not assume that
hearsay has been forbidden since the inception of the common law. The
truth of the matter is that English courts functioned for several hundred
years before they firmly adopted this restriction near the middle of the
eighteenth century.5 It is not surprising to find that exceptions to this
harsh rule developed to allow extra-judicial declarations in some situations.
Some. of the exceptions were established from the time of the adoption of
the rule.6 Later exceptions were derived from the exigencies of particular
situations. 7 The number of hearsay exceptions has increased so that the
Uniform Rules of Evidence8 list 31, while most authorities have grouped
approximately the same subject matter into 14 to 18 categories.9 Most of
the hearsay exceptions have been a part of the law of evidence long
enough to be well settled rules upon which the courts may comfortably
rely, but this is not to say that the rules governing admissibility of extra-
judicial declarations have matured to the point where they exhibit the
epitome of common law efficiency and logic.10 Scholarly attempts to
elucidate the complex situation created by the many exceptions have been
directed toward announcing a general rule as a test for admission of
hearsay. Thayer, in his great treatise, suggested a more liberal test for
admission of evidence based on its relevancy." The courts, however, turned
4. "Under no other system of law than the Anglo-American has a general rule been
laid down by the courts that relevant hearsay evidence is to be entirely disregarded
in the trial of lawsuits." Wickes, Ancient Documents and Hearsay, 8 TExAs L. REV.
451, 475 (1930).
5. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LITIGATION 108-09 (1956).
6. Id. at 107-08.
7, 5 WMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
8. UNwoaM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63.
9. Professor Morgan has named reported testimony, admissions, confessions, declara-
tions against interest, dying declarations, business entries, commercial lists, official
written statements, res gestae declarations, declarations concerning pedigree, reputation,
declarations as to private land boundries, ancient writings, attestation of documents,
and learned treatises as the generally recognized exceptions. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 254-368 (1961); cf. 5 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1426.
10. "Finally, and this is fundamentally serious, few if any lawyers or scholars can
succinctly collate the hearsay exceptions in common use, let alone intelligibly state the
measure of their aggregate effect upon our law of proof." Maguire, The Hearsay
System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAN. L. REV. 741, 774 (1961).
.11. "A true analysis would probably restate the law so as to make what we call the
hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is
relevant is admissible. To any such main rule there would, of course, be exceptions;
but as in the case of the other exceptions, so in the hearsay prohibition,- this classifica-
tion would lead to a restricted application of them, while the main rule would have
freer course." THAYER, A PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 522 (1898). Thayer
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a deaf ear to this advice, and followed the precedents by holding that
hearsay was inadmissible if it failed to come within one of the rather
narrow categories recognized as exceptions.12 Wigmore followed Thayer
in attempting to advance the cause of reform by purporting to find that
the reasons for the exceptions could be coordinated under the two heads
of necessity and "circumstantial probability of trustworthiness." 13 Only
rarely have the courts heeded the advice of the scholars,14 and they have
continued to exclude hearsay where it did not fit one of the recognized
exceptions.' 5
The appellant in the instant case brought the problem of the strict
exceptions to the hearsay rule squarely before the court by contending that
the newspaper was not admissible "under any recognized exception to the
hearsay doctrine."'16 In an excellent study of the controversy surrounding
the hearsay rule, the court stressed the confusion caused by the numerous
hearsay exceptions. 17 The court, however, refused to follow the route of
least resistence by acknowledging one of the hearsay exceptions as a basis
for its decision. Only the G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co.',
case decided in 1913 offered assistance by showing an alternative method.
thought that there must be truly important grounds for the rejection of relevant
evidence. "The two leading principles should be brought into conspicuous' relief, (1)
that nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of some matter requiring
to be proved; and (2) that everything which is thus probative should come in, unless
a clear ground of policy or law excludes it." Id. at 530.
12. A typical statement of this attitude was announced by Lord Blackburn in the
case of Sturla v. Freccia, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 623, 647 when he said, "I base my
judgment upon this, that no case has gone so far as to say that such a document
could be received; and clearly, unless it is to be brought within some one of the
exceptions, it would, fall within the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible."
13. 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1420. Compare this section with 3 WioGonu,
EvIDEN E § 1420 (2d ed. 1923). This comparison will indicate that the more accurate
language of "circumstantial probability of trustworthiness" has been substituted for
"circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness." Professor Morgan's slightly different
approach is that the test of admissibility should be "(a) whether the hearsay is such
that the trier can put a reasonably accurate value upon it as evidence of the matter
it is offered to prove, and (b) whether direct testimony of the declarant is unavailable
or, if available, is likely to be less reliable." MOnrAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 254.
14. For an early adoption of a liberal test, see G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate
Publishing Co., 207 Fed. 515 (1913). The most progressive of state courts seems to
be the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. See O'Haire v. Breton, 102 N.H. 448, 159
A.2d 805 (1960) (report made in 1955 by now deceased engineer admitted).
15. "Statements of parties outside of court are ordinarily inadmissible, unless they
come within some of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, either where they are made
as part of res gestae, or where they are declarations against interest as classified in
our statute .. . or some of the other recognized and established exceptions to the
hearsay rule." Welch v. Thomas, 102 Mont. 591, 601, 61 P.2d 404, 407 (1936); see,
e.g., Kalamazoo Yellow Cab Co. v. Sweet, 363 Mich. 384, 109 N.W.2d 821, 822 (1961).
16. 286 F.2d at 391.
17. "However, the law governing hearsay is somewhat less than pellucid." Id. at
392 & n.3.
18. 207 Fed. 515 (1913).
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As did Judge Learned Hand in the Merriam case, this court cut through
the "smoke" to the real problem of whether an adversary should be
deprived of the benefits of cross-examination when the evidence offered
"may otherwise be lost"'19 and the nature of the assertion is such that the
trier of fact could give it a "reasonably accurate value."20 First, the Wig-
more requirement of "necessity" was applied to the facts by ,showing that
even if witnesses to the 1901 fire could be found, their testimony based on
memory would not be as accurate as the "contemporary newspaper
article."21 The second requirement of "trustworthiness" was met by point-
ing out that the results of either a deliberate desire to falsify or mere
inaccuracy would have been corrected because of the public nature of the
declarationm22 In stating its decision the court made clear its disapproval
of the stereotyped exceptions to the hearsay rule, when it said:
We do not characterize this newspaper as a "business record," nor as an "ancient
document," nor as any other readily identifiable and happily tagged species of
hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy,
relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial judge's exercise of
discretion in holding the hearing within reasonable bounds. 23
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals might have upheld the district court
on the basis of the "ancient documents" exception,2 A but, instead, it chose
to base its holding on a broader rule. The decision in the instant case looks
beyond the misleading exceptions to the ideal goal of using "the exercise of
common sense in deciding the, admissibility of hearsay evidence."2 Legal
thinkers have long believed that the trier of fact should have all valuable
and relevant evidence presented to it as a basis for its decision.26 Although
the opinion in the Dallas County case goes a long way toward the scholar's
utopia, it is not to be assumed that there is a great movement away from
the standard methods for determining when hearsay is admissible27 This
19. 286 F.2d at 396.
20. MORGAN, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 254. Note that Professor Morgan's liberal
language is used here, but this seems to be the practical effect of the "circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness" test.
21. 286 F.2d at 396.
22. Id, at 397.
23. Id. at 397-98.
24. See Trustees of German Township v. Farmers & Citizens Say. Bank Co., 113
N.E.2d 409 (Ohio C.P.), aff'd, 115 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (80-year-
old newspaper held admissible). But see State v. Otis Elevator Co., 10 N.J. 504, 92
A.2d 385 (1952) (lower court upheld in rejecting 40-year-old newspaper).
25. 286 F.2d at 397.
26. Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14
VAND. L. REv. 725 (1961).
27. "Just what time will determine the result to be is hard to tell, for any considera-
tion of hearsay is bound up with a slowly unfolding historical growth that has thus far
resisted most efforts to stimulate a faster growing process." Ladd, The Hearsay We
Admit, 5 Ox.. L. Rzv. 271, 288 (1952). General resistance to change is also indicated
by the fact that no jurisdiction has adopted the Model Code of Evidence, and the hear-
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decision and similar efforts by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,O
however, show the way; one can only hope that other courts will choose to
follow their example.
Restraint of Trade-Anti-Trust Law-Complete
Divestiture of Stock Ordered as Remedy
For Violation of Section 7 of Clayton Act
In a 1957 decision the Supreme Court found that the defendant corpora-
tion had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act' by its twenty-three per cent
holding of General Motors stock which tended to lessen competition and
create a monopoly in the automotive fabrics and finishes markets. 2 On
remafid "for a determination . . . of the equitable relief necessary and
appropriate... to eliminate the effects of the acquisition offensive to the
statute,"3 the district court decreed that while all voting rights incident
to Du Pont's ownership of General Motors stock must be divested by a
"pass through"4 to the shareholders of Du Pont, legal title to the stock
with all other incidents of ownership could be retained by the defendant
corporation.5 On appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Complete divestiture by Du Pont of its General Motors stock is
the only effective remedy for this violation of section 7 of the Clayton
say" provisions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence have had only limited acceptance.
Maguire, supra note 9, at 741 n.1.
28. See note 14 supra.
1. 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958):
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly."
2. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). But
see United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. I!I.
1954), holding that Du Pont, Delaware Realty, Christiana Securities Co., and Gen-
eral Motors had violated neither § 7 of the Clayton Act nor §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. Delaware and Christiana are holding companies controlled by the Du Pont
family. Although neither was a party to the action, both consented to be bound by
the lower court judgment.
3. 353 U.S. at 607-08.
4. This is the procedure through which the holders of the Du Pont stock, rather
than the corporation itself, would exercise the voting rights of General Motors stock
held by Du Pont. The voting rights given to each stockholder would be proportional
to his holding of outstanding shares of Du Pont stock.




Act. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 366 U.S. 316
(1961).
The Clayton Act is directed toward the same inherent evils of unlawful
combinations-as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and was enacted to supple-
ment and bolster the Sherman Act.6 Neither statute expressly provides for
the use of divestiture as a remedial solution.7 Rather discretion is vested
in the trial judge to frame a decree granting the necessary relief.8 Divesti-
ture, however, has historically been a remedy utilized by the courts for
Sherman Act violations effected through intercorporate stock acquisitions
and combinations.9 Although the litigation involving violations of section
7 of the Clayton Act has been limited relative to that of the Sherman Act,
in the majority of section 7 cases the courts have ordered divestment.'0
There is authority for the proposition that divestiture is mandatory for
Clayton Act violations,'1 but the majority of courts called upon for a
determination of an appropriate remedy in civil proceedings under both
the Clayton and Sherman acts have been guided by the premise that relief
is to be remedial not punitive,'2 and that divestiture is not to be used
indiscriminately or as a matter of course.13 Apparently this continued use
6. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922). The
function of the Sherman Act is to eliminate proven monopolies while that of the
Clayton Act is "to reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in their incip-
iency" and to extinguish tendencies toward monopoly. 258 U.S. at 356.
7. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); KAYsEN & TuRaNa, ANTTrrusT PoLicY
111 (1959); 2 WHrrNEY, AlmmusT PoLiciEs 385-92 (1958). But see Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
8. The Court, in remanding the instant case after a determination of liability, said:
"The . . . courts, in the framing of equitable decrees, are clothed 'with large discretion
to . . . fit the exigencies of the particular case'." 353 U.S. at 607-08; accord,. Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944). In IAYSEN & TuRNES, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 111, the authors term the trial judge's range as "the tremendous area of discretion
in making remedies."
9. See, e.g., International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959);
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904); HALE & HALE, MAmr Powan: SiZE AND SHAPE UNDR Tm SHmumMw ACT
371 (1958).
10. See, e.g., Maryland & Va. Milk Producers' Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960); Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (1922). But see American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
United States v. New England Fish Exch., 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919). There
have been several consent decrees accepted by the FTC which have not required
complete divestiture. E.g., Vendo Co., 54 F.T.C. 253 (1957); International Paper Co.,
53 F.T.C. 1192 (1957). Cf. 2 WHrrNEY, ANirusT PoLicuES 391 (1958).
11. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elee. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
12. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947); Hartford-Em-
pire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 409 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Comment, 58 MiCH. L. REv. 1024, 1039 (1960).
13. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951). Courts
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of divestiture is grounded on a belief in its unquestioned effectiveness in
suppressing the antitrust violation by creating an opportunity for the
restoration of competition in the encroached line of commerce. The courts
have evolved three criteria in determining the proper relief for antitrust
violations of this nature: (1) the duty to give complete and efficacious
effect to the prohibitions of the statute; (2) the achievement of an effec-
tive result with a minimum of injury to the public interest; (3) a proper
regard for the vast interests of private property vested in owners of stocks
or securities who are in no way responsible for the violation. 14
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,15 based
his decision on the finding that no relief short of complete divestiture
would be adequate to assure proper redress of the violation of section 7.16
The Court concluded that a pass through of voting rights to the share-
holders 17 of Du Pont would result in a continued community of interest
between the-two corporate entities arising from the 40 million shares of
General Motors stock remaining under the dominion of Du Pont stock-
holders.18 The majority reasoned that such an arrangement would make it
implicitly beneficial to the interest of defendant's shareholders to vote the
stock in such a manner as to induce General Motors to favor Du Pont.10
Justice, Brennan refused to be governed by possible economic injury of
significant magnitude in individual cases to the shareholders of Du Pont
and General Motors, holding that economic considerations, no matter how
onerous, could be an auxiliary factor only in the selection of a remedy
proven effective 20
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a vigorous dissent, reasoned that a pass
through of voting rights, coupled with the other restrictive provisions of
the lower court decree would achieve an effective redress of the violation
of section 7.21 To the dissenters the original violation of the Clayton Act
dealing with unlawful stock acquisitions order the relief "necessary and appropriate"
to eliminate any reasonable possibility of continued monopolization. 177 F. Supp. at 50.
14. 366 U.S. at 327-28; United States v. American Tobacco Co, 221 U.S. 106, 185
(1911); Wise, Three D's of Antitrust Enforcement, 1958 INSTrITTE ON ArrrrnusT
LAws 105 (1958).
15. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas. Mr. Justice
Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration of the case. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Stewart and Whittaker, dissented.
16. 366.U;S..at 334.
17, None of Du Ponts 220,000 shareholders or General Motors' 700,000 shareholders
were found guilty of an antitrust violation. 177 F. Supp. at 10.
18. 366 U.S. at 331-32.
:19. ibid.
20. Id. at 328.
21. Id. at 379. A summary of the district court's pertinent remedial provisions
follows. Du Pont, Christiana, and Delaware were enjoined from acquiring further
General Motors stock except as to stock or rights that might be distributed to them
purely as stockholders. of. General -Motors. Du Pont, Christiana, and Delaware werb
prohibited. from having common officers, directors, or employees with General Motors.
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resulted from Du Pont's voting power of General Motors stock and the
consequent mutuality of directors between the two corporate entities 2
It followed that once the voting rights had been divorced and the two
corporations enjoined from maintaining interlocking directorates,23 the
intent of the lawmakers in framing section 7 had been met.24 The divesti-
ture of voting rights appeared to be sufficient relief because this arrange-
ment brought the defendants within the so-called failing corporation ex-
ception to section 7 whereby those corporations holding stock merely for
investment purposes are excluded from the purview of the statute28
Stating his view that the province of the trial judge had been invaded,2
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the effect on the securities market
coupled with the tax consequences of total divestiture to the shareholders
of Du Pont were adequate grounds for the rejection of divestiture by the
trial judge in his formulation of a remedial decree.=
There appear to be two distinct schools of thought as to the propriety
of the use of divestiture as a remedy for stock acquisitions and combina-
tions violative of the antitrust laws. The majority in the instant case ad-
hered to the conviction that divestiture is the preferred mode of relief,28
to be rejected only for compelling and extraordinary reasons.29 Although
expressly rejecting the government's theory that divestiture is the manda-
tory remedy prescribed by Congress for section 7 violations,3 the Court,
in shifting the burden of persuasion, requiring the defendant to show that
a proposed remedy short of divestiture would be completely effective,31
The defendant corporations were restrained from entering into any joint business
venture with General Motors or knowingly holding stock in any business enterprise
in which General Motors held stock. General Motors and Du Pont were required to
-deal with each other at "arm's length" during the continuation of the stockholding
period. Separate provisions preserved the right of either party to appeal for a modifi-
cation of the decree in the event of a change in circumstances and reasonable means
-of inspection by the Department of Justice were inserted in the decree to insure
compliance with the judgment by Du Pont, Christiana, Delaware, and General Motors.
22. 366 U.S. at 338-40.
23. Id. at 359-60.
24. ibid.
25. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958):
"This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for invest-
ment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
-to bring about the substantial lessening of competition."
26. 366 U.S. at 356-79.
27. Id. at 361.
28. Id. at 328-31. The majority said divestiture "should always be in the fore-
.front of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found." Id. at 331; Adams,
Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J.
1 (1951).
29. Id. at 328-31.
30. Id. at 328 n.9.
31. Id. at 331-32. Compare with Judge Wyzanski's statement in United Shoe that
"the Court agrees that it would be undesirable, at least until milder remedies have
'been tried, to direct United to abolish leasing forthwith." 110 F. Supp. at 348.
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has come to the position of a presumption in favor of divestment. This
view runs counter to the rising sentiment expressed by Judge Wyzanski
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.32 that extreme caution
ought to be the guide in ordering the drastic remedy of divestment.P Wide
discretion is to be vested in the trial judge to formulate an equitable de-
cree.M These "cautious" courts have not granted divestiture absent a
finding that the stocks or assets in question have been acquired by means
violative of the antitrust laws5 or a clear showing by the complaining
party of the necessity of divestiture to insure effective competition.3 Al-
though the conservative approach of the dissent is more sympathetic to
the wrongdoer, it would seem that in view of the distinct possibility of
serious market disruptions and adverse tax and trade affects on third
parties that relief for antitrust violations of this nature should remain
flexible, with broad discretion left to the trial courts in the framing of an
equitableremedy on the basis of the record and the independent findings
of the trial judge0 7
Clearly there is foundation for an original finding in the instant case for
the necessity of divestment due to the continued community of interest
between the two corporations, but it would appear that the trial judge
also had a firm basis for ordering only partial divestiture. It is very likely
32. "In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded . . . an authority they
have in no other branch of enacted law. . . .They would not have been given, or
allowec to keep, such authority in the antitrust field .. .if the courts were in the
habit of preceding with surgical ruthlessness that might commend itself to those
seeking absolute assurance that there will be workable competition, and to those
aiming at immediate realization of the social, political, and economic advantages of
dispersal of power." 110 F. Supp. at 348. See also ICRONSTEMN, MILLER & SCnWA'Rz,
MODEm ANrrrnusr LAw 180 (1958).
33. See note 32 supra. KAvsEN & TuRNER, ANriusT POLICY 111 (1959); Brown,
Injunctions and Divestiture, in AN ANaimiusr HANDOOK 545 (ABA Section of Anti-
trust Law ed. 1958).
34. See note 8 supra.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944);
United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. Reading
Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904);
A-r'y GEN. NAT'L Commar. ArrrausT REP. 355 (1955).
36. 110 F. Supp. at 346-51; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951); KnONSTEmN, MmLER & ScmvAurz, MODERN ANmTRusT LAw 180 (1958);
A-r'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 354 (1955). The Committee proposes four
standards to be complied with by the Department of Justice before requesting the use
of divestiture as a remedy: (1) it should not be invoked as a penalty; (2) it should not
be used where less drastic remedies are effected; (3) it is important to consider possible
detrimental affects to the industry involved; (4) once divestiture has been ordered, a
plan to effectuate the decree must take into consideration the affect on the public
and the violator as well as interested parties such as investors, customers, and employees.
Id. at 355-56.
37. "There are two basic principles which govern the application of this form of
xelief in antitrust cases.... The application of these two principles is dependent upon
the circumstances in each individual case." Wise, Three D's of Antitrust Enforcement,
1958 INsarrur ON ANcrrusT LAws 105, 107 (1958).
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that the widespread distribution of voting rights of the General Motors
stock to the 220,000 Du Pont shareholders coupled with the other restric-
tive provisions of the decree 38 will completely eliminate any effects for-
bidden by the statute.39 Following the logic of the government adopted
by the Supreme Court in its mandate4° the same avenues for coercion will
remain open, as the majority of the stock will go to Du Pont stockholders
in the form of dividends over a ten year period, leaving these Du Pont
investors in a position to apply pressure to the management of General
Motors to favor Du Pont.
The majority in the instant case was cognizant of the possibility of
serious economic repercussions to the shareholders of General Motors and
Du Pont,41 but evidently felt that no overwhelming or irreparable damage
would result.42 Although a definitive judgment of the tax and market
consequences of the decree would be difficult at present, there are sub-
stantial indications that no great loss to General Motors or Du Pont in-
vestors will occur. Congress is now considering a bill, passed by the
House and reported favorably out of committee in the Senate, to mitigate
the harsh tax burden for Du Pont stockholders; 43 in the current state of
the securities market prospects are excellent that, given effective pro-
gramming of selling efforts, institutional investors will absorb spaced
offerings of the General Motors stock over the ten year divestment period
without permanently depressing the price of the stock.44 The majority
opinion is consistent with the proposition that unless divestiture were
ordered in this case its use as a remedy for section 7 violations would be
materially curtailed. The logic of this position is that if divestiture is not
ordered in a section 7 violation involving two of the country's largest
corporatons, it is very doubtful that the trial courts would subsequently
order divestment for violations on a smaller scale. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the decision might have been more meaningful had the majority
made explicit the view that part of its finding was colored by the size of
the corporations involved.
38. See note 21 supra.
39. 366 U.S. at 359-60.
40. Id. at 334-35.
41. Id. at 326-28.
42. Id. at 327 n.7.
43. H.R. 8847, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also S. REP. No. 1100, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).
44. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 53-80, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F.
Supp. 333, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) the court required divestiture of 35% of the out-
standing common stock of Aluminium, Ltd., over a ten year period; as of 1959 90% of
the required stock had been divested. Generally, during this period the stock's market
price performance was better than that of most industrials.
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Taxation-Income Tax-Deduction Allowed Husband
For Entire Alimony Payment to Wife Unless
A Portion Thereof Is Specifically Designated
For Child Support
In a divorce decree,' it was provided that the wife, W, would have
custody of the three minor children and that the husband, H, would make
certain periodic payments to W for the support of W and the children.
Should any one of the children marry, become emancipated, or die, these
payments were to be reduced one-sixth. For the taxable years 1951 and
1952, H deducted from his gross income all of the payments made under
the decree. The Commissioner determined a deficiency, claiming that the
language of the agreement impliedly designated one-half2 of the payments
for the support of the children and that this part of the payments, there-
fore, was not deductible by H.3 The Tax Court approved the Commis-
sioner's disallowance,4 but the court of appeals reversed.5 On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed. H6 may deduct
from his gross income, payments made to W under a divorce decree, ex-
cept portions thereof which are specifically designated as payable for the
support of a minor child. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
Prior to 1942, there was no provision in the Code for a deduction of
any alimony payments by H. Furthermore, it had been settled in the
1. A written agreement was made in anticipation of divorce and subsequently ap-
proved by the divorce court. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 300 (1961).
2. That is, one-sixth for each of the three children.
3. The Commissioner makes this contention under § 22(k) of the 1939 Code, which
provides:
"[PJ eriodic payments . . . received [by the wife] subsequent to [a decree of
divorce] ... in discharge of... a legal obligation which, because of the marital or
family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such
decree . . . shall be includible in the gross income of such wife .... This sub-
section shall not apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the terms
of the decree . . . fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of the pay-
ment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such hus-
band." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942)
(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71). (Emphasis added.)
and under § 23(u), which provides:
"[There shall be allowed as a deduction] . . . in the case of a husband described
in section 22(k), amounts includible under section 22(k) in the gross income of
his wife, payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year." Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23(u), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816 (1942) (now INT. Rrv.
CODE OF 1954, § 215).
4. Jerry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959),
5. Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
6. As used in the Code and in this article, the terms "husband" and "wife" should
be read as "former husband" and "former wife," and if the alimony payments are
being made to the husband by the wife, then the terms "husband" and "wife" should
be reversed. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797(a)(17), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 816
(1942) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (17)).
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leading case of Gould v. Gould7 that these payments were not taxable to
W.8 In 1942, Congress shifted the tax burden of alimony to W,9 but the
new provision did not apply to any amount which was "fixed" by th6 de-
cree as payable for the support of minor children. 10 Under the new law,
combined payments to W for alimony and child support, with no part of
the total amount designated as either, have been held entirely taxable to
W.11 Litigous difficulties have arisen, however, where the decree does not
distinctly designate alimony and child support but does provide that the
total payments will be altered upon the happening of some future event.'2
In these situations the Tax Court and the various circuit courts have ren-
dered conflicting decisions.13 Using the results reached as a basis of divi-
sion, the approach of the Tax Court and the First, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits has been characterized as the liberal view, while that of the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits has been called the strict view.14 If the debree pro-
vides for an alteration of the payment upon the happening of some con-
tingent event, then the liberal view courts have construed this'to be an
indirect designation of a part as child support.'5 On the other side of the
7. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
8. The Court reasoned that the payments were not deductible by H because they
were a personal expense and were not taxable to W since they were a portion of the
husband's estate to which W was equitably entitled. 245 U.S. at 153. That the Court
was also "influenced by the fact that H had no deduction and taxing the payments to
W would result in double taxation," see Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1362, 1363 (1959). See
Lagomarcino, Federal Tax Consequences of Alimony and Separate Maintenance Pay-
ments, 3 BUFFALO L. 1Ev. 179 (1954).
9. The most frequently given reason is that increased surtax rates could work a
hardship on H. STANLEY & KILLCULLEN, ThE FEDERAL INcOME TAX 26-27 (4th ed.
1961); Lagomarcino, supra note 8, at 180; SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TrON 1044 (5th ed. 1960). For -other reasons see Note, supra note 8, at 1363.
10. Note 3 supra.
11. Dora H. Moiteret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946); Henrietta Seltzer, 22 T.C. 203 (1954);
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(k)-l(d) (1953) (now Treas. Reg. 1.71-1(e)); Annot., 4
A.L.R.2d 252, 271 (1949).
12. 13 S.C.L.Q. 288, 289 (1961); STANLEY & KILICULLEN, supra note 9, at 28.
13. See Eisenger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 913 (1958); Dorothy H. Hirshon, 27 T.C. 558 (1956), rev'd, 250 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1957); Well v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 353 U.S. 958
(1957); SuRmu & WAMEN, supra note 9, at 1101-02.
14. Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1959).
15. Within this category, however, there is a variation in the tests expressed by the
courts. In Jerry Lester, 32 T.C. 1156, 1159 (1959), rev'd, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 299 (1961), it is said: "The Tax Court . . . has felt that'pay-
ments, made by the husband to the mother of his children, which are obviously in-
tended to include both alimony for the wife and support for the minor child or
children should not be regarded entirely as alimony . . if the terms of the agreemeht
or decree contain a reasonable indication of how the total payment is to be divided."
(Emphasis added.) The Tax Court has found portions fixed for child support where
the decree provides for reduction in payments at the marriage, emancipation, or death
of the children, Jerry Lester, supra; change in custody of the children, Truman W.
Morsman, 27 T.C. 520 (1956), acq., 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 4; and remarriage of the
wife, Eisenger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303, (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
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controversy, the strict view courts seem to hold that unless there is a direct
arid exclusive designation of part of the amount for child support, the
whole payment will be taxed to W as alimony.16
To resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
instant case.17 The Court first considers the legislative history of section
22(k). From a detailed examination of the congressional debates and hear-
ings on the section, the Court finds that the child support clause was meant
to effect a tax shift only where an amount was "specified" as child support
in the decree.18 Taking a. broader view, the Court points out that in divorce
agreements like the one in this case, W has unrestricted use of the whole
payment and that "the power to dispose of income is equivalent of owner-
ship of it."19 Therefore taxing the whole amount to W, unless a portion is
specified for child support, is consistent with the "underlying philosophy
of the Code."2 0 The Court then considers the Commissioner's contention
that the decree in this case does "fix" one-half of the payments for child
support. To answer this contention, the Court points to the uncertainty of
the tax consequences where designations for child support may be implied
from the provisions of a divorce decree,2' and the Court finds that it was
the intent of Congress to eliminate these uncertainties through strict word-
itig in the statute322 Therefore, the Court concludes, allocations for child
support will not be determined by inference but only where the parties
clearly and specifically designate them. 3
913 (1958). The First and Seventh Circuits have followed the Tax Court. Metcalf v.
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959); Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50
(7th Cir. 1950). The Ninth Circuit expresses the rule in terms of "sufficient certainty
and specificity . ..without reference to contingencies which may never come into
being," but reaches the same result. Eisenger v. Commissioner, supra. See generally
Note, 45 VA. L. 1Ev. 1362 (1959); 13 S.C.L.Q. 288 (1961).
16. In Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958
(1957), the court said: "We hold that sums are 'payable for the support of minor
children' when they are to be used for that purpose only. Accordingly ...their use
must be restricted to that purpose, and the wife must have no independent beneficial
interest therein." Id. at 588. See also Deitsch v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.
1957); Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1362 (1959).
17. 366 U.S. 299, 301 (1961).
18. The term "specified" was used in explaining the part of the proposed amend-
ment on child support to the Senate Committee on Finance. Hearings on H.R. 7378
Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1942). When the
section was originally proposed in 1941, it stated that child support payments must be
"specifically designated" as such if they are to be included in H's gross income. H.R.
5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 117 (1942). In the final version the term "specifically
designated" was changed to "fix," but this was explained as a 'little more streamlined
language" rather than a change in legislative intent. Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before
the Senate Committee on Finance, supra.
19. 366 U.S. at 303-04.
20. Ibid.
21. See notes 7-16 supra and accompanying text.
22. S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 32 (1942).
23. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote, "In an early income tax
case, Mr. Justice HIolmes said 'Men must turn square corneis when they deal with
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This decision has settled a controversy which existed for nearly twenty
years. It is a decision of special importance today because section 22(k)
was incorporated essentially unchanged into the 1954 Code.24 In deciding
who will pay the income tax on the money used for support of the children,
the parties to a divorce or separation agreement have several collateral
considerations. 25 Among these are loss of the right to file a joint return and
its income-splitting advantages, 5 the difference in their respective tax
brackets, 7 the qualification of either to deduct for dependents,.2 the
deduction of medical expenses if these are required in substantial amounts
for the children,29 and the effect on tax rates if the wife qualifies for head
of household status.3 With these considerations in mind the parties may
negotiate the tax consequences of child support payments to their mutual
advantage. Whatever the results of these negotiations may be, two things
are now clear. If they intend for H to bear the tax on money paid for
support of the children, they must clearly specify what portion of the
total payment to W is to be used for child support, and if they agree that
W should pay this tax, they may still provide for altering the payments
upon the happening of a future event, without fear that a designation for
child support will be implied from these provisions.
the Government.' The revenue laws have become so complicated and intricate that I
think the Government in moving against the citizen should also turn square comers
. . . . The present agreement makes no specific designation of the portion that is
intended for the support of the children. It is not enough to say that the sum can be
computed. Congress drew a clear line when it used the word fix. Resort to litigation;
rather than to Congress, for a change in the law is too often the temptation of gov-
ernment which has a longer purse and more endurance than any taxpayer." 366 U.S.
at 306-07.
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71(b) relating to payments to support minor chil-
dren is worded identically like the child support clause of § 22(k). The major change
in § 71 of the 1954 Code is that it includes payments made to W pursuant to a
written separation agreement, even though there is no legal divorce or separation.
Lagomareino, Federal Tax Consequences of Alimony and Separate Maintenance Pay-
ments, 3 BUFFALO L. REv. 179, 185 (1954).
25. See generally N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON FED. TA.X 901, 911-17 (1960).
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013.
27. For example, W might receive all of the payments as alimony and still pay no
tax if her income is low enough, while H may deduct the total payment. Also, if
there is a wide difference in their tax rates, H might be induced to pay more because
it could all be deducted by him.
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 151(e), 152(a).
29. This in turn depends on whether the child is a dependent. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 213.
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1(b)(1), (2).
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Taxation-Income Tax-Lodging Expenses Allowed
As Medical Expense Deduction
Taxpayer claimed as a medical deduction, in his federal income tax
return, lodging expenses incurred while spending several winter months
in Florida.' Taxpayer had been advised to go there by his doctor
because of previous heart attacks. The Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction on the basis that the expenses were not necessary to taxpayer's
medical care and that, even if they were necessary, they were not allowable
under section 213(e) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.2 Only "transpor-
tation expenses," according to the Commissioner, were included in the
definition of "medical care"; meals and lodging were not within that con-
cept. On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals from a decision
of the Tax Court allowing the deduction, held, affirmed.3 Deductions for
medical expenses under section 213 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
include lodging expenses if they are primarily for and essential to medical
care. Commissioner v. Bilder, 289 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961).
Under section 23(x) of the 1939 Code,4 the predecessor of section 213
of the 1954 Code, the lower federal courts allowed both transportation
and lodging expenses as medical deductions in "proper cases."5 The Com-
missioner acquiesced in these decisions6 and allowed the deductions when
they were incurred primarily for medical care.7 The determination of an
allowable deduction was difficult, however, since transportation and lodging
expenses claimed as medical deductions bore the characteristics of normal
living expenses expressly made non-deductible by section 24(a)1 of the
1. Taxpayer also included as a medical deduction transportation expenses for the
trip; this, however, was a factual question of medical necessity and not a question of
law. If they were medically necessary, then they were deductible under INT. REV.
ConE OF 1954, § 213(e)(1)(B). Taxpayer claimed similar deductions for his family
who had accompanied him.
2. "Definitions.-For purposes of this section-(1) The term "medical care" means
amounts paid-(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease . . .
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in
subparagraph (A)."
3. In affirming the decision of the Tax Court that taxpayer's expenses were deduc-
tible, the circuit court reversed the Tax Court's decision that similar expenses incurred
by taxpayer's family were not medically necessary to taxpayer and allowed them as a
medical deduction.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x).
5. Deductions were allowed in: Embry's Estate v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D.
Ky. 1956) (deductions allowed for the expenses of taxpayer's wife); L. Keever String-
ham, 12 T.C. 580 (1949), reviewed by the Tax Court, acq., 1950-2 Cum. BuLL. 4,
affd, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950). Deductions were disallowed in: Samuel Ochs,
17 T.C. 130 (1950); Samuel Dobkin, 15 T.C. 886 (1950); Edward A. Havey, 12
T.C. 409 (1949); Martin W. Keller, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1949).
6. I.T. 3786, 1946-1 CuA. BULL. 75; Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 307, 308.
7. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(x)-i (1944).
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1939 Code. In Edward A. Havey,8 the Tax Court enumerated several fac-
tors which, although not conclusive, were to be considered in making this
determination: the motive of the taxpayer in incurring the travel expense,
the advice of taxpayer's doctor upon which he acted, the relationship be-
tween the illness and the treatment, and the proximity in time of the
treatment to the illness.9 To avoid allowing taxpayers to write off vacation
expenses as a medical deduction, the courts strictly applied these standards
in determining medical necessity.' 0 In writing section 213 of the 1954 Code,
Congress included a proviso expressly allowing transportation expenses as
a medical deduction when they were necessary to taxpayer's medical care
but made no mention whatever of lodging expenses." The purported
reasons for this change from the 1939 Code are found in the committee
reports on the section.12 At the same time, Congress reemphasized, in
section 262, that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter,
no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
13
The question of whether lodging expenses could constitute a medical
deduction under these changed provisions of the 1954 Code had never
been decided by an appellate court prior to the instant case.
On appeal to the circuit court, the Commissioner contended that even
though the lodging expenses were necessary to taxpayer s medical care,
they should not be deductible. 14 He reasoned that the express proviso in
the 1954 Code allowing transportation expenses reflected the intent of
Congress to exclude lodging expenses, an intent confirmed by a reading
8. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
9. Previous cases had employed these factors in reaching a decision. In the Dobkin
and Keller cases, supra note 5, the deductions were disallowed'because the taxpayer
could not prove a direct relation between the illness and treatment.
10. John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950), the court said that not all expenses
incurred upon a doctor's advice are allowable as a medical deduction. See, e.g., the
cases in note 5 supra where the deductions were disallowed.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213(e)(1) (B). See note 2 supra.
12. In both the Senate and House reports on the 1954 Code, the following appears:
"The deduction permitted for 'transportation primarily for and essential to medical
care' clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of any meals and
lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment. For example, if a doctor
prescribes that a patient must go to Florida in order to alleviate specific chronic
ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic conditions which have proven injurious
to the health of the taxpayer and the travel is prescribed for reasons other than the
general improvement of a patient's health, the cost of the patient's transportation to
Florida would be deductible but not his living expenses while there." H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, A60 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35,
219-20 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
13. Section 262 of the 1954 code replaced INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (1),
which had provided that: "In computing net income no deduction shall in any case
be allowed in respect of-(1) personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary
medical expenses deductible under Section 23(x) .... "
14. It should be noted that on appeal the Commissioner changed his argument. In
the Tax Court he contended that the expenses were not medically necessary.
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of the committee reports.15 The taxpayer denied such a Congressional
intention and maintained that since section 213(e) (1) (A) of the 1954
Code16 defined medical care in the same terms as did the 1939 Code, and
since the cases construing the latter permitted lodging expenses as a
medical deduction, the 1954 Code also permitted such deductions. The
Court decided that on its face the 1954 Code does not exclude lodging
expenses and that the legislative history was too ambiguous to be con-
trolling.17 On the basis that the policy underlying both of the codes-the
promotion of public health-was the same, and that the 1954 Code was
similar to the 1939 provisions which had been construed to ajlow lodging
expenses as a deduction in proper cases, the court decided that these
expenses remain deductible under the 1954 Code. The determination of
the medical necessity of the expenses in this case was not before the court
since the Commissioner had not challenged the finding of the Tax Court
in this regard.18
In the recent case of Carasso v. Commissioner,19 decided after the instant
case, the Second Circuit held that although lodging expenses might be
necessary to taxpayer's medical care they were not deductible under the
1954 Code. The Carasso court found the legislative history of section
213(e) more illuminating than did the Third Circuit and from it concluded
that there was a legislative intent not to allow lodging expenses as a medi-
cal deduction.20 It seems a reasonable prediction that certiorari will be
granted in one of these cases by the Supreme Court to remedy this split
in the circuits. It is submitted that the Carasso case and not the instant
case will be followed. The committee reports are not so ambiguous that
they can be disregarded, and they can not be read without it being appar-
ent that the adoption of the new definition of medical care was intended to
15. See note 12 supra.
16. See note 2 supra.
17. See note 12 supra. The court found the reports were ambiguous in stating
that the new proviso "clarifies existing law" and in stating that only transportation
expenses for health, and not the ordinary living expenses incurred during such a trip
were deductible. The judicial interpretations of the 1939 Code were clear and ordi-
nary living expenses had never been deductible. Ambiguous reports "cannot be
availed of under the teaching that the use of legislative history is to solve, but not to
create, an ambiguity." United States v. Shreveport Grain & El. Co., 286 U.S. 77, 83,
(1932).
18. The court was confronted with the factual determination of taxpayer's family's
expenses. The court took judicial notice that when a person has had four previous
heart attacks he should not live alone especially when he is a hyperkinetic person.
In reversing the Tax Court's decision and allowing the expenses of the family It ap-
pears that the court took into consideration the factors considered in Edward A.
Havey, supra note 8.
19. 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961).
20. The court referred to Justice Hastie's dissenting opinion in the instant case as
the proper result. His opinion was based on the same committee reports and on
section 262 of the 1954 Code.
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permit deduction of the cost of transportation necessary for health but not
meals and lodging during the trip. Section 262 seems controlling. It im-
poses upon the taxpayer the burden of showing a code section which
expressly provides for the deduction of what would otherwise be a normal
living expense. Nowhere in section 213 is there such an express provision
for the deduction of meals or lodging.
Taxation-Income Tax-Transfer of Appreciated Stock
To Wife in Divorce Settlement Held Not
To Produce Income to Husband
Stock with an appreciated value was transferred by taxpayer to his wife
in exchange for a release of her marital rights pursuant to a property set-
tlement agreement.1 The Commissioner determined that the amount of
appreciation should be taxed as a capital gain on the theory that this
appreciation was realized by the taxpayer because of the transfer. Tax-
payer, after paying the deficiency under protest, claimed a refund on the
grounds that no taxable gain was realized from the transfer. In the United
States Court of Claims, held, for the taxpayer. The fair market value of
the property transferred by a taxpayer to his wife in exchange for a re-
lease of her marital rights is not determinative of the amount of gain or
loss realized by the taxpayer on the transaction. Davis v. United States,
287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 813 (1961).
Generally in a transfer of property, the amount of taxable gain is the
excess of the "amount realized" over the adjusted basis2 of the property
transferred.3 The Code defines the "amount realized" as the sum of
money received plus the fair market value of any property received.
4
There is no difficulty in determining the value of the property transferred
in exchange for the release of a wife's marital rights. The problem is
whether the release received from the wife should be similarly valued. The
Third Circuit, in Commissioner v. Mesta,5 held that where the fair market
1. "Mrs. Davis agreed to accept 'the division of property herein provided [in the
agreement] in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against
the husband whatsoever (including but not by way of limitation, dower and all rights
under the laws of testacy and intestacy), which she ever had, now has, or might ever
have against the husband by reason of their relationship as husband and wife or
otherwise."' Brief for Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Claims, p. 26, Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961),
cert. granted, 368 U.S. 813 (1961).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1011.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
5. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1941). For a discussion
of this case see 9 U. Cm. L. REV. 525 (1942).
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value of the wife's release could not be otherwise ascertained, the fair
market value of the property transferred should be used in determining the
value of the release. The court concluded that when a person exchanges
property having a fixed value for property having an unliquidated value,
he is presumed to be getting his money's worth.6 The Sixth Circuit, while
adopting this test for transactions of a purely commercial nature,7 rejected
its application where a release of a wife's marital rights was involved.8
Commissioner v. Marshman9 held that the parties in a marriage settlement
were not in the position of a willing buyer and a willing seller 10 and could
not be presumed to be getting their money's worth from the transaction.
The instant case follows the Marshman decision in concluding that the
value to a husband of a wife's release could not be determined by the
value of the property he had transferred to her. Although the Court of
Claims has used this criterion in valuing other property transfers, 1 it has
refused to do so where the property is exchanged for the release of a wife's
marital rights.'2 The court here goes so far as to say that no value 13 could
be placed on the release.' 4 Had this transaction been at arms length and
strictly commercial, the result probably would have been different.'5 The
Mesta rule could not be applied, the court reasons, because the Code re-
quires taxable gain to be determined by the use of fair market value of
6. 123 F.2d at 988. This same conclusion was reached by the Second Circuit in
Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1942).
7. In United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), the court
used this view in determining the amount of taxable gain realized by a corporation
when it transferred stock with an appreciated value to a trust fund set up to provide
pensions for its employees.
8. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918
(1960).
9. Ibid.
10. "[Flair market value is the price at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell." Id. at 32. See In re Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.
1958); Fitts v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1956); Helvering v. Walbridge,
70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1934); Metropolitan St. Ry. v.
Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S.W. 860 (1906). See generally 4 CCH 1961 STAND. FED.
TAx REP. 11 4430.07.
11. United States v. General Shoe Co-rp., supra note 7.
12. "Again we agree with the .. .Marshman case that a transaction between a
husband and a wife made under the emotion, tension and practical necessities in-
volved in a divorce proceeding does not comply with this rule." 287 F.2d at 174.
13. "The Commissioner has for many years asserted that 'only in rare and extra-
ordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value.' While the
courts, have occasionally criticized this bold assertion, they have also strained on
occasion io 'avoid holding that what the taxpayer received had no fair market value."
Hacker, Bringing Capital Gains Into Focus, 12 W. REs. L. REv. 244, 248 (1961).
14. The reason for the property having no valuation was that the valuation was
"dependent upon so many uncertain factors that neither the taxpayer nor a revenue
officer could do more than guess at it." 287 F.2d at 174.
15. See note 7 supra.
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the property received,16 and fair market value could not be determined
in this case by the "willing buyer-willing seller" test because of the emo-
tions and tensions necessarily involved in a divorce proceeding. No at-
tempt is made by the court to distinguish the Mesta and Marshman cases;
it simply adopts the rule it deems more likely to bring about a just result.
While the courts have held that property transfers pursuant to ante-
nuptial agreements are subject to the federal gift tax,17 they have refused
to so decide with regard to post-nuptial property settlements. 18 Con-
ceivably, it could be argued that such post-nuptial property settlements
are not subject to income tax just as the courts refuse to hold them subject
to gift tax. However, the better argument seems to be that since such
transfers are not subject to gift tax, they should be taxed as a realization
of income by the husband. In reaching its decision, the Court of Claims
was faced with conflicting decisions of the circuits. By adopting the rule
of the Marshman case and rejecting that of the Mesta case, this court
failed to provide any guidance on the important problem of the tax basis
of the property transferred. Several questions must be taken into considera-
tion in seeking a solution to this problem. If the release is not to be
valued, at what basis will the wife hold the property transferred to her?19
If the wife's basis is the fair market value of the property at the date of
transfer,20 who is taxed on the realization of the appreciated value of the
property? On the other hand, if the wife's basis is to be that at which the
husband held the property, does not this seem to indicate that this transfer
was a gift and thus in conflict with the courts' holdings? 21 By giving the
answer to each question that seems justified, it appears clear that the rule
of the Mesta case is the better rule to be applied in these situations. Since
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari22 in this case, the conflict of
decisions should be resolved within a short time.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
17. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945).
18. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
19. For a discussion of the basis of property acquired. in a divorce settlement see
5 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx REP. ff 4516.55.
20. Commissioner v. Mesta, supra note 6; Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and
the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225, 235
(1959). Cf. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
21. This type of property transfer was held not to be a gift for gift tax purposes in
Harris v. Commissioner, $upra note 18.
22. Certiorari was granted on the instant case in the early part of October 1961.
368 U.S. 813 (1961).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Wills-Contest-Right of Heirs-at-law To Contest
Not Affected by Prior Unprobated
Disinheriting Wills
Testatrix executed a series of seven consecutive wills whereby no part of
her estate was left to the heirs-at-law. The last of these wills, executed in
1955, bequeathed the bulk of testatrix's estate of over three quarters of a
million dollars to a designated residuary legatee. The next preceding will,
executed in 1953, made certain specific bequests and provisions for charita-
ble trust beneficiaries. Upon proponent's petition for probate of the 1955
will, the heirs-at-law objected on the grounds of fraud, undue influence
and mental incompetence. Proponent challenged the right of the heirs to
contest contending that even if the 1955 will were successfully overthrown
the heirs-at-law would be barred from any interest in the estate by virtue
of the prior disinheriting wills. Proper execution of these wills was con-
ceded but none had been probated. Both the probate court and the circuit
court found the heirs to be proper contestants. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, held, affirmed. 1 Heirs-at-law are proper parties to
contest a will notwithstanding the possible effect of prior, duly executed,
but unprobated wills whereby the heirs are disinherited. In re Powers
Estate, 106 N.W.2d 833 (Mich. 1961).
Clearly a decedents estate should not be subjected to frivolous or un-
necessary litigation by parties having no interest in its disposition. Accord-
ingly the determination of requisite interest is preliminary to the issue of
the validity of a will.2 Following this policy, statutory provisions which
generally allow "persons aggrieved" or "interested" to contest a will have
been consistently interpreted by the courts as limiting the right to contest
to parties whose interest would, in a pecuniary sense, be adversely affected
by establishment of the will.3 Under this construction a beneficiary under
a will whose interest has been diminished by a subsequent will is a proper
contestant 4 and, as a general rule, an heir-at-law or next of kin who
stands to take a larger share of the estate should intestacy occur, is con-
1. The court, however, found that under Michigan statutes the county prosecuting
attorney and not a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court is the proper
party to contest a will in behalf of undetermined charitable trust beneficiaries and
accordingly reversed a contrary decision of the circuit court on this issue.
2. E.g., Winters v. American Trust Co., 158 Tenn. 479, 14 S.W.2d 740 (1929).
3. E.g., Cassem v. Prindle, 258 Ill. 11, 101 N.E. 241 (1913). This construction has
been adopted even where the statute provides for contest by "any person." See
generally ATrlNsoN, WULs § 99 (2d ed. 1953); trrc=m, ALFORD & EFFLAND, DECE-
DENs" EsTATEs AiN Trusrs 228-29 (2d ed. 1961).
4. E.g., Crowley v. Farley, 129 Minn. 460, 152 N.W. 872 (1915); Kennedy v. Wal-
cutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928) (beneficiary may contest although prior
will upon which he relies has not been probated).
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sidered as having a sufficient interest to contest.5 The courts, however,
have not agreed upon the precise nature of the interest which an heir-at-law
must possess to be a proper contestant. A number of jurisdictions have
adhered to the view that a showing of heirship merely establishes a prima
facie right to contest which may be successfully challenged by the existence
of a previous, valid,6 but unprobated will which disinherits the heirs-at-
law.7 Under these circumstances the heir is said to have merely a possi-
bility of an interest or an "apparent interest" rather than the "substantial
interest" required of a proper contestant.8 Underlying these legal conclu-
sions the primary motivation of the courts is apparently a desire to avoid
a multiplicity of suits9 coupled with a belief that in a practical sense the
heir's possibility of ultimate success has been greatly diminished by the
number of wills which must be challenged.10 On the other hand, perhaps
a majority of courts" have been unwilling to consider a prior unprobated
will as a valid will to the prejudice of the heirs-at-law and have declared
that until a will has been probated it is merely a "scrap of paper," indeter-
minative of substantive rights.'2 These jurisdictions have reasoned that a
previous will, introduced to defeat the right of the heirs-at-law, may never
be offered for probate or if so, may also be the subject of contest.13 Thus
under the so called "scrap of paper doctrine," "an heir-at-law may contest
without any other showing of interest than heirship."14
After recognizing this conflict of authority, the Michigan court in the
instant case embraced the scrap of paper doctrine as the "preferable" view.
The court made reference to a Michigan statute which provided in essence
5. 3 PACE, Wnffs § 26.52, at 118-19 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961); ATmnvsoN, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 519.
6. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
7. Wilcoxen v. Wilcoxen, 165 Ill. 454, 46 N.E. 369 (1896); In re Livingston's Es-
tate, 179 Iowa 183, 153 N.W. 200 (1915); Succession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175
So. 72 (1937); Cowan v. Walker, 117 Tenn. 135, 96 S.W. 967 (1906).
8. Cowan v. Walker, supra note 7, 96 S.W. at 970-71.
9. "[T]o maintain that the wills which have not been probated cannot be consid-
ered in determining whether the Plaintiff has a right of action to annul the last will
would ... be contrary to that policy of the law, which is opposed to a multiplicity of
suits .... ." Succession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175 So. 72, 81 (1937). But see 12
Tur. L. REv. 475 (1937), suggesting that multiplicity of suits would not in fact be
avoided by the Feitel decision.
10. This consideration is well illustrated in Succession of Feitel, supra note 9, 175
So. at 81, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Black in the instant case. 106 N.W.2d
at 841 (1961).
11. Lonas v. Betts, 160 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Stephens v. Brady, 209 Ga. 428,
73 S.E.2d 182 (1952); Hilfikev v. Fennig, 224 Ind. 594, 69 N.E.2d 743 (1947); Marr
v. Barnes, 126 Kan. 84, 267 Pac. 9 (1928); Murphy's Ex'r v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1460, 65 S.W. 165 (1901).
12. Marr v. Barnes, 126 Kan. 84, 267 Pac. 9, 10 (1928).
13. E.g., Murphy's Ex'r v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1460, 65 S.W. 165, 166 (1901).




that an unprobated will may not pass title to property15 and reasoned that
by implication a prior will which has not been probated cannot serve to
disinherit. Relying upon language utilized in In re Dutton's Estate,16 the
court concluded that the authority in Michigan is disposed to the view
that while an unprobated will may be of some evidentiary value it is not
determinative of substantive rights.17
It is important to note that an eminent authority has implied that there
is some basis, procedural at least, for distinguishing the two apparently
conflicting views discussed above. According to Atkinson an heir or next
of kli is a proper contestant even if excluded by a previous will,18 but
where the prior unprobated will is "admitted to be valid," the heirs have
been denied the right to contest.19 Some of the cases, however, are vague
as to whether validity of the prior will was in fact conceded,s° and other
opinions indicate clearly that a concession of validity has not always been
determinative of the issue.2 ' Apparently the courts in reviewing the deci-
sions of other jurisdictions on this point have either been unaware of this
distinction or have not considered it controlling. It is difficult to see why
the heirs would make such a concession or how this factor could be con-
trolling where treatment of an unprobated will as a valid will would con-
flict with the court's interpretation of the necessity for probate under the
probate statutes.22 Assuming therefore that there is a basic conflict in this
15. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (90) (1943).
16. 347 Mich. 185, 79 N.W.2d 608 (1956). It is interesting to note that the
Dutton opinion was written by the dissenting judge in the instant case. There Judge
Black stated: "An instrument submitted as a final testament enjoys no legal, distin-
guished from evidentiary, worth unless and until it is authenticated by judgment. The
reason given .. .is that it cannot be told whether the instrument .. .is void or
not until it has 'passed the ordeal of probate'."
17. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Black would allow introduction of prior unprobated
wills in evidence and place the burden upon the disinherited heirs of showing, "prima
facie at least," that each of the previous wills would not have been entitled to probate
had testatrix died shortly after its execution.
18. ATKiNsoN, op. cit. suprh note 3, at 519 (citing, e.g., Lonas v. Betts, supra note
11; Stephens v. Brady, supra note 11; Marr v. Barnes, supra note 11). In the instant
case it is apparent that due execution but not validity was conceded.
19. Ibid. (citing Wilcoxen v. Wilcoxen, 165 II. 454, 46 N.E. 369 (1896); Cowan v.
Walker, 117 Tenn. 135, 96 S.W. 967 (1906)). (Emphasis added.) See also 3 PAcE,
Wnrs § 26.52, at 121 & § 26.9, at 22 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
20. E.g., Cowan v. Walker, 117 Tenn. 135, 96 S.W. 967 (1906). But see note 19
supra and accompanying text.
21. In Stephens v. Brady, 209 Ga. 428, 73 S.E.2d 182, 183-84 (1952) (holding the
heirs to be proper contestants) the court stated: "One ground of the propounder's
motion for a directed verdict was that . . . 'the evidence shows and statement of
counsel in his place admitted that a prior will ...was duly and properly executed
and that-it was'd valid will' .... (Emphasis added.) But see note 18 supra and
accompanying text. In Sbccession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175 So. 72, 79 (1937)
(holding the heirs not to be proper contestants) there was no concessionl of validity
of the prior unprobated wills.
22. Clearly where there is no coricession of validity of the prior wills tle heir's right
to contest should not be denied. It is suggested that where such concession is made
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area of the law, the view that a prior unprobated will may be introduced
in evidence and its validity determined to defeat the right of the heirs-at-
law to contest is supported by a strong argument. On the surface this
rationale would avoid excessive litigation by determining the validity of
a previous will together with the heir's standing to contest the last will in
a single proceeding. Furthermore, the heir-at-law's right to contest would
be cut off under circumstances where in all probability more than one
will would have to be contested thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits23
instigated by parties whose possibility of eventual success seems unlikely.
It has been urged that this policy would also discourage a certain class of
heirs whose true motive in seeking to contest is the exaction of a tributory
settlement.2 However convincing this argument may be, it is difficult to
see how the mere fact that a testator has executed more than one dis-
inheriting will can operate to divest the right of the heirs-at-law to contest
the last will.25 Initially the heirs-at-law are granted a legal interest in a
decedents estate by virtue of the intestate laws. Thus if the heirs are
disinherited by a single will which is found to be invalid it is the general
policy of the law that the estate should devolve upon the heirs-at-law or
next of kin. Yet, under the view discussed above it would seem that this
policy could be at least partially defeated by the due execution of two or
more apparently valid disinheriting wills since the heir would have no
opportunity to contest their validity. Perhaps more troublesome to avoid
is the proposition that heirs or next of kin who are eligible and entitled to
take under the intestate laws do in fact have a pecuniary interest which
will be adversely affected by the establishment of any will whereby they
are disinherited.26 The mere assumption that an heir-at-law's possibility
by way of demurrer the heirs should not be barred. Judging from the language of the
Kansas court in Marr v. Barnes it would seem that an unprobated will could not be
considered a valid will even if validity had been conceded. See 267 Pac. at 10. And
see Lonas v. Betts, 160 F.2d 281, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (prior unprobated will is not
in issue).
23. But see 49 CoLum. L. REv. 275, 277 (1949).
24. This factor apparently bore a great deal of weight with the dissenting judge in
the instant case. See 106 N.W.2d at 839.
25. This reasoning was employed by the Georgia court in Stephens v. Brady, supra
note 11, at 184: "The interest of the husband in the estate of his deceased wife, as
an heir, was not severed by the mere existence of a prior will, but would continue to
exist until that former will was probated. If the former will had been offered for
probate unquestionably the husband would have been entitled to file a caveat. The
execution of a second will by testatrix could not affect the right of the husband to
-contest the probate of the first will. The mere existence of a prior unprobated will
-could have no effect on the interest of the husband, as an heir, to caveat the second
will." (Emphasis added.)
26. Several courts have found support for the contrary view in cases involving a
xelease or settlement executed by the heir. The Tennessee court, in Cowan v. Walker,
117 Tenn. 135, 148, 96 S.W. 967 (1906), denied a twice disinherited heir's right to
.contest on the basis that the heir had merely an "apparent interest." The court's
.authority for this proposition was Wynne Ex'r v. Spiers, 26 Tenn. 394 (1846). In the
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of ultimate success as a contestant is remote, it is submitted, has no real
bearing upon the issue of the right to contest.27 Therefore it is believed
that the holding in the instant case is based upon a fair implication of the
Michigan statute2 8 and that the court, despite the existence of a rather
extreme fact situation,29 arrived at a desirable conclusion.
Wynne case the court held that a husband was without interest and therefore estopped
to resist probate of his former wife's will when the husband and wife had previously
executed a deed of compromise pending a divorce suit whereby the wife was conveyed
a separate estate absolutely with right to dispose of the same by will or otherwise. Tle
court stated: "It is well settled that.., a kinsman.. who could take nothing under
the statutes of distribution if there were no will, shall not disturb it. ... 7 Tenn. at
407. (Emphasis added.) It is clear in Wynne that the husband had divested himself of
any interest in the wife's estate and could have taken nothing even had the wife died
intestate. Similarly, the dissenting opinion in the instant case relied primarily upon
In re Zinkes Estate, 235 Mich. 201, 209 N.W. 83 (1926). The Zinke case held that
testator's grandson had no standing to contest as heir of his predeceased father where
the father had accepted a full settlement of his share and interest in the estate from the
testator during the latter's lifetime. Here the court concluded that since the agree-
ment was a valid contract or release of the father's interest in the estate, the grand-
son was not entitled to take under the statutes of descent and distribution and there-
fore could gain nothing in a successful contest. It is erroneous to suppose that the
principle of Cowan and Zinke has any application to situations where the heirs are,
as in the instant case, in fact eligible to take under the laws of descent and distribution
should intestacy be ultimately established.
27. The issue involves the determination of a substantive right which should not
be denied on the basis of the inconvenience or unlikelihood of obtaining a remedy.
28. See note 15 supra. Under a similar statute which provided that a testament
must be probated before it can have effect, the Louisiana court concluded that this
did not mean that an unprobated will is not admissible in evidence to determine the
right of the heirs to contest. Succession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175 So. 72, 80 (1937).
For a criticism of this construction see 12 Tur. L. REv. 475 (1937).
29. The dissenting judge in the instant case was apparently impressed by the
number of wills and the fact that the heirs-at-law were distant relatives of testatrix
who had been "marshalled into court by an heir hunting corporation." Although one
may have little sympathy for the heirs under these circumstances, it is suggested that
these facts have little bearing upon the true issue, i.e., whether the right of the heirs-
at-law to contest may be defeated by a prior, unprobated, disinheriting will.
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